Protecting Undersea Infrastructure in the North American Arctic

In response to recent incidents damaging undersea energy infrastructure and communication cables in the Baltic Sea and High North, NATO countries have intensified their focus on critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) protection on the national, bilateral, and multilateral levels.

Allies in the North American Arctic can build on important NATO initiatives but, given distances and the unique operating environment in this theater, the responsibility for protecting CUI assets in territorial waters will fall primarily to the United States, Canada, and the Kingdom of Denmark.

CUI in the North American Arctic is currently limited. But climate change, the green energy transition, and greater reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) will increase the demand and opportunity to expand communication cablesand energy infrastructure in the region. At the same time, increased traffic and resource exploration heighten the vulnerability of these assets, especially to deliberate attack from Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both powers rely on dual-use assets that increase plausible deniability, and they continue to develop undersea warfare capabilities.

To enhance resilience and protect CUI in the North American Arctic, the United States and its NATO allies are strongly encouraged to:

• urgently upgrade US as well as NATO allies’ situational awareness and presence in the air, space, and undersea domain, cooperating closely with the private sector

• prioritize and upgrade the role of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) to conduct CUI threat assessments and identify assets that are especially vulnerable due to their strategic importance, location, complicated ownership structure, or symbolic value

• expand US and NATO response options to counter hybrid threats and deter CUI attacks; consider establishing an additional maritime high-readiness force

• increase NATO’s presence to protect and defend nearby assets during and after Russian and PRC naval maneuvers

• build on NATO’s Digital Oceans Initiative to enhance and integrate unmanned systems and AI information processing tools into exercises and operations

• identify counterparts in other national governments to ensure quick and seamless information sharing following CUI incidents

• deepen public-private cooperation as well as government oversight over privately owned CUI to incentivize the private sector’s CUI resilience (e.g. fortifying cables, integrating monitoring capabilities, and ensuring adequate repair capabilities)

• clarify responsibilities of CUI protection and defense across the civil, military, and private sectors, including the transition of responsibilities from the Department of Homeland Security to the Department of Defense in crisis situations

• train and exercise crisis decision-making processes with the involvement of all relevant actors (including the private sector and state and local authorities) on the national, bilateral (Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark), minilateral, and multilateral levels

• clarify and enhance legal frameworks to respond to CUI incidents in territorial and international waters, and share best practices across all sectors

• use pro-active strategic communication to outline legal and military authority in responding to CUI incidents, attributing attacks, and enhancing deterrence against future threats