The Invisible Battlefield

With high-level summits, new initiatives, and massive spending commitments dominating headlines, the EU appears poised for a collective Zeitenwende in defense. Its exact contours remain undefined, but the shockwaves of Ukraine’s brutal war and the bold posture of the Trump administration have spurred an unprecedented mobilization to finally fund the bloc’s security needs and strengthen its capabilities. Yet, as Europe debates its future defense posture, adversaries also wage a quieter but highly disruptive war, relentlessly assaulting the integrity of the information space that underpins democracy. This domain may be less visible, but countering information threats must also be treated as an essential defense priority. Europe’s momentous decisions on the future of its security will otherwise remain dangerously incomplete.

Ukraine has demonstrated in the starkest terms that modern warfare is fought on the battlefield and in the information space. For years, Russia has been bombing cities and minds, waging relentless information warfare to weaken Ukraine’s resolve and fracture Western support. Other critical allies have faced similar attacks. Moldova, for instance, has endured a sustained onslaught of Russian information manipulation aimed at destabilizing its government, influencing its elections, and derailing its march toward the EU. Last year’s dual elections in the country showcased the brazenness of this interference, a pattern likely to repeat in this fall’s parliamentary vote. 

There is no firewall shielding EU member states from these threats.

In 2024 alone, the bloc faced an unprecedented wave of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) attacks. A notable example was the dismantling of a Russian propaganda network in Prague, which reportedly paid European politicians to spread pro-Kremlin narratives through the Voice of Europe website. France, too, was heavily targeted, particularly around last year’s Olympics and parliamentary elections, while Germany’s political landscape, including farmer protests, became the focus of sustained disinformation campaigns, including those waged by the infamous Doppelganger network, that aimed to shape public opinion and deepen societal divisions. Other operations sought to smear European politicians with false corruption allegations, incite protests, suppress voter turnout, and undermine trust in European institutions. No major incidents were recorded, but the European External Action Service (EEAS) also detected numerous FIMI activities targeting last June’s European elections that followed a familiar pattern of cyber-enabled interference and trust erosion.

To its credit, the EU has made meaningful strides in countering FIMI within and beyond its borders. Led by the EEAS, the bloc has developed the EU FIMI Toolbox, a strategy centered on situational awareness, resilience, regulation, and international cooperation. Threat recognition has improved, and the introduction of restrictive measures into the mix has added teeth to the EU’s response repertoire. The development of a Rapid Alert System now helps coordinate responses across member states, while legislation such as the Digital Services Act has enhanced regulatory oversight. International partnerships with NATO and the G7 have further reinforced Europe’s defenses, and the newly established FIMI Information Sharing and Analysis Centre offers a platform for cross-sector collaboration. Meanwhile, the upcoming European Democracy Shield signals the EU’s intent to expand and deepen these efforts.

Despite these notable steps to improve defenses and create resilience, the threat has metastasized. Indeed, the frequency, sophistication, and impact of FIMI attacks have surged, with foreign adversaries increasingly relying on information operations to achieve their strategic goals. Their campaigns have become more professional, easier to obscure, refined in execution, and industrial in scale.

Within the EU, political will to counter Russia’s FIMI operations has strengthened since the invasion of Ukraine, but threat recognition remains uneven. Some hesitate to confront China’s interference operations, for example, and other state and non-state actors often remain in the shadows. Alarmingly, the FIMI playbook is no longer exclusive to foreign adversaries as domestic actors across the EU increasingly weaponize these tactics for political gain. And while some member states have developed specialized counter-FIMI structures, such as France’s Viginum agency, many others lag behind, exposing vast disparities in counter-FIMI readiness. The expert community—critical to Europe’s defenses—often lacks access to key data, while funding for civil society remains inadequate, often politicized, and misaligned with the scale of the threat.

It is clear that, despite progress, Europe remains dangerously exposed. 

Protecting its information space is as vital as defending its borders, meaning FIMI must be treated with the same urgency as conventional threats. But what does that look like in practice?

First, FIMI must be fully integrated into Europe’s core defense strategy, not merely treated as an add-on. The EU must leverage tools such as the Digital Services Act to their full potential and move beyond merely calling out bad actions to naming bad actors. This would demonstrate confidence in its intelligence, situational awareness, and political resolve. Empowering the expert community with proper funding and institutional backing is equally critical, as is holding digital platforms accountable for due diligence. Many member states still lack basic counter-FIMI structures and must urgently develop the necessary workforce and expertise to support this effort. And while cooperation with the G7 and NATO is essential, the EU must also be prepared to confront the threat head-on, perhaps even alone, should transatlantic commitment waver, as it appears it will on this issue set.

Above all, just as Europe is preparing for historic decisions about its defense in response to battlefield threats, it must summon the same level of political resolve and strategic imagination to safeguard its information space. Foreign interference and information warfare are threats that are just as real, and their consequences no less dangerous. Compared to the visceral horrors of kinetic conflict, the information domain may seem intangible. But when a fundamental democratic emergency arises as a result of information warfare—and it is a matter of when, not if, that happens—Europe cannot claim that it did not see the crisis coming.