Germany’s Turning-Point Election
Almost three years to the day after the start of the Russian attack on the whole of Ukraine, Germans will elect a new parliament. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, they will do so under the impression of a concrete threat to their national security. In the East, Russia’s war of aggression has thrown the European security order into disarray. In the West, Donald Trump’s electoral victory has deprived it of the foundational US security guarantee. As they confront the most significant crisis since the end of the Cold War, Europeans find themselves increasingly on their own, and their central power seems leaderless and disoriented. The upcoming federal election on February 23, will determine how serious Germany is about its response to the Zeitenwende, the “epochal tectonic shift” brought about by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Can Germans be convinced to write off the “peace dividend” and make the necessary investments to effectively deter Russian aggression even without an unconditional American security guarantee?
The Unanswered Turning Point: Zeitenwende
Despite repeated admonition from Washington, and despite Russia’s attack on Georgia in 2008 and its invasion of Crimea and the Donbas in 2014, Europe was thoroughly unprepared for the attack that Russia launched on 24 February 2022—not only on Ukraine but on Europe as a whole. “With the attack on Ukraine”, Olaf Scholz stated just a few days later, “Putin … is not just seeking to wipe an independent country off the map. He is demolishing the European security order that had prevailed for almost half a century since the Helsinki Final Act.”
In almost three years since, many European countries—and Germany in particular—have failed to use President Joe Biden’s term in office to address the most pressing deficits. Support for Ukraine remained hesitant; the rearmament program was insufficient, and the defense-industrial base was weak. Efforts to prepare the public for a potential major confrontation were half-hearted. While Germany prides itself on being the largest supporter of Ukraine in Europe, this is true only in absolute terms. If measured as a percentage of GDP, Germany’s support ranks only 14th among its European peers. Whereas Poland, for example, almost doubled its defense spending as a share of GDP from 2.2% in 2021 to 4% in 2024, Germany can only achieve the NATO minimum target of 2% with the help of a €100 billion “special fund” for the Bundeswehr. How even this minimal ambition—let alone the 5% target recently set by Donald Trump—is to be met once the “special fund” expires is unclear, especially given the country’s strict “debt brake” essentially prohibiting government borrowing.
A Triumph of the Lack of Will
Effective—meaning, credible—deterrence is based on two prerequisites: military capabilities and the political will to use them.
Much has been written about expanding capabilities by building a viable military-industrial base and sustaining a corresponding procurement program. It is undisputed that Europe has the resources necessary for this: “European NATO allies and EU member states together outspent Russia four to one on defense in 2023; their combined military forces are larger than those of Russia or the US; … Europe’s GDP is ten times larger than that of Russia,” the European Council on Foreign Relations reports. On virtually all relevant dimensions, Europeans are structurally better off with regard to Russia today than they were at the end of the Cold War.
The fact that Europe and Germany have not yet been able to translate these structural advantages into an effective deterrent is mainly due to the lack of political will to operationalize—or weaponize—them. While Germany’s federal government received much praise for the €100 billion “special fund” for the Bundeswehr, it simultaneously spent twice as much on subsidizing consumers’ energy bills to shield them from the consequences of the war. Out of fear of an electoral backlash, placing an extra financial burden on Germans was to be avoided at all costs, as were the spending cuts that any clear prioritization of expenditures would call for. Even government borrowing was considered out of bounds. With very few exceptions, political leaders did—and do—want to avoid any semblance of a heightened state of alert or tension, as they still seem less afraid of the military threat than of the public reaction to preparing for it. Consequently, the public is still largely unaware of—and unprepared for—the actual costs and constraints associated with the Zeitenwende.
A Hesitant Public
Whether the Zeitenwende can lead to renewed security will thus largely depend on whether the parties and candidates are prepared to confront their voters with the harsh realities and consequences of a Europe at war.
The battle order is already taking shape: proponents of Olaf Scholz’ current, careful and overly cautious approach are at the center of the debate, under fire from both sides. On one end of the spectrum is the faction of appeasers who want to give in to the pressure of aggressive and revisionist powers out of a fearful “ego-pacifism”, as Berthold Kohler argued in the Frankfurt Allgemeine newspaper. On the opposite end are the hawks who demand a more determined and independent European deterrence policy. Yet, while Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democratic CDU and Robert Habeck of the Greens advocate a more robust stance on Ukraine and deterrence, they, too, have their liabilities: the CDU’s almost religious adherence to the “debt brake” will constrain Merz’s ability to borrow the money needed to build credible deterrence. Habeck, on the other hand, does not have the full support of his traditionally pacifist party for his ambitious call to spend at least 3.5% of GDP on defense.
Ultimately, the voters will decide which policy Germany will pursue and which approach will receive a democratic mandate. In principle, strengthening Germany's defense readiness has enjoyed surprisingly high public support since the start of the Russian full-scale attack on Ukraine in February 2022: of Germans surveyed, 81% support an increase in defense spending, and a narrow majority of 52% support the reintroduction of conscription. However, when asked about their own willingness to contribute, support decidedly dwindles: according to a YouGov poll, only around 27% of Germans support spending cuts, 14% support suspending the debt brake, and just 7% support tax hikes to increase the Bundeswehr’s financing. According to a Forsa survey, only 17% of Germans are prepared to pick up weapons to defend their country.
The perception of threat among Germans is still insufficient for the propagated Zeitenwende to result in a fundamental change of behavior or shift of priorities. Neither Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, nor its hybrid attacks on NATO member states, nor Donald Trump’s reelection seems to have effected any fundamental change. Germans will not change their attitude towards defense and deterrence, let alone come to accept sacrifices of their own. To change this requires principled and determined political leadership.
Political Leadership Required
Following months of deadlock and infighting over the operationalization and financing of the Zeitenwende, the snap election also provides an opportunity for a fresh and clear democratic mandate for a genuinely new German security policy. Yet, an election campaign that thus far centers on tax cuts and pension guarantees does not suggest—or even allow—that such a mandate will be forthcoming. This makes the challenges for the next federal government all the more significant. Following lofty campaign promises of “more of the same”, it will be challenging to familiarize Germans with the idea that the “peace dividend” has been used up and that security and freedom are no longer (practically) free.
The political risks associated with this challenge have been clear since long before the recent state elections in eastern Germany and the presidential election in the United States. But if Germans shy away from this, a retired German general cautions, they run the high risk that deterrence will no longer work against Putin. He may consider the West too weak and too decadent to match his willingness to sacrifice and suffer.
It is up to the Germans and their elected leaders to decide whether they are prepared to risk their security. For now, the cost of credible deterrence is primarily financial. If it fails, the price will likely be measured in human lives and lost livelihoods. This is the choice facing Germans as they head to the polls.
Prof. James D. Bindenagel, is a former US ambassador and GMF visiting distinguished Berlin fellow.
Dr. Karsten Jung is a professor at the Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences, Brühl.