



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

*Key Findings 2005*

# Transatlantic Trends 2005 Partners

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Methodology: TNS Opinion & Social was commissioned to conduct the survey using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews in all countries except Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey, where lower telephone penetration necessitated the use of face-to-face interviews. In all countries a random sample of approximately 1,000 men and women, 18 years of age and older, were interviewed. Interviews were conducted between May 30, 2005 and June 17 2005.

For results based on the total national sample in each of the 11 countries surveyed, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus 3 percentage points. For results based on the total European sample, the margin of margin of error is plus or minus 1 percentage point. The average response rate for the eleven countries surveyed was 24.6%.

Europe-wide figures are weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each country. The 2004 and 2005 Europe 9 averages (EU9) represents the combined responses of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom, while the Europe 10 average (E10) represents responses from these same countries plus Turkey. The Europe-wide average from 2002 (EU6) was constructed using responses from France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom, while the 2003 Europe-wide average, also referred to as the Europe-7 average (EU7), uses responses from these same countries plus Portugal. For ease of presentation both the EU6 and EU7 averages are listed as part of the Europe 9 average throughout the text. Unless otherwise specified, comparative data comes from Transatlantic Trends 2003-2004 and/or from Worldviews 2002.

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## TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

### *Key Findings 2005*

After a first term marked by a crisis in transatlantic relations around the war in Iraq, the re-election of George W. Bush in 2004 seemed likely to some observers to prolong estrangement between the United States and Europe. Strikingly, President Bush launched his second term with an ambitious diplomatic effort to improve relations with Europe, setting a new tone of cooperation and identifying democracy promotion as the centerpiece of his foreign policy, a goal on which he hoped Americans and Europeans could agree. Six months into this new term, as the Administration looked for signs of a new spirit of transatlantic cooperation, the European Union (EU) found itself in crisis with the French and Dutch rejections of the referenda on the proposed European constitutional treaty. Many worried that a prolonged period of “introspection” about its future would turn the EU inward, away from foreign policy challenges in the Balkans, the Middle East, and beyond.

Conducted in June 2005, this survey allows us to evaluate the impact of President Bush’s efforts to mend relations with Europe, as well as European attitudes toward the EU at a time of crisis. We found that the Administration’s efforts have not yet moved European public opinion, although concerns about increased anti-Americanism have also not materialized. Europeans continue to feel positively about the EU even after the referenda rejections, and most Europeans have not made up their minds whether the inclusion of Turkey would be good or bad for the EU. Notably, Europeans support the goal of democracy promotion even more than Americans.

Americans continue to be divided about President Bush after his re-election and especially about international institutions like the United Nations. However, on many issues there is considerable bipartisan agreement. Significant popular support exists on both sides of the Atlantic for the United States and Europe to work together to face global problems. Large majorities of both major political parties in the United States want the EU to exert international leadership just as large majorities of Europeans would like to see the EU cooperate with the United States.

Transatlantic Trends is a comprehensive annual survey of American and European public opinion. Polling was conducted in the United States and ten European countries: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Fundação Luso-Americana and Fundación BBVA.

#### **Key findings of this survey include<sup>1</sup>:**

- Despite major diplomatic efforts to improve transatlantic relations in the first six months of the second Bush presidency, there has been little change in European public opinion toward the United States.
- At the same time, there is no evidence of increased anti-Americanism. Europeans continue to distinguish their more negative feelings toward President Bush from their evaluations of the United States taking a leading role in world affairs.

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<sup>1</sup>Unless otherwise noted, all Europe-wide percentages refer to E10 in sections one and five and to EU9 in sections two and three where we discuss the opinions of current EU members.

- Even after the rejections of the EU constitution, Europeans continue to have positive feelings about the EU. Strikingly, Europeans who see themselves as more likely to be personally affected by an economic downturn or by immigration do not show significantly cooler feelings toward the EU.
- While negative attitudes toward Turkish membership in the EU have increased since last year, even in Turkey, the largest percentage of Europeans (EU9 42%) remain ambivalent, seeing Turkish membership in the EU as neither good nor bad.
- Seventy percent of Europeans (EU9) want the EU to become a “superpower” like the United States, but they differ on what being a superpower means: Twenty-six percent believe that the EU should concentrate on economic power and do not want to increase military spending, while 35% value both military and economic power and are willing to pay for them.
- A majority of Europeans (EU9 60%) support a single EU seat on the UN Security Council, even if this would replace the seats currently held by France and the UK, including 62% of French and 64% of German respondents. Only the UK disagreed, with 55% opposed.
- Europeans are more likely than Americans to support democracy promotion (EU9 74% to 51%). Both Europeans and Americans strongly prefer “soft power” options to promote democracy, with only 39% of Americans and 32% of Europeans (EU9) who support sending military forces.
- Republican support for democracy promotion more closely mirrors Europeans’ with 76% favorable, compared to only 43% of Democrats. While both parties support soft power options, nearly twice the percentage of Republicans (57%) than Democrats (29%) support military intervention.
- As the United States and Europe (EU9) look forward toward engagement with China, there is agreement on both sides that respect for human rights needs to be considered, even if this means limiting economic relations.
- Americans and Europeans show no consensus concerning options for dealing with the possibility that Iran may develop nuclear weapons, although only a small minority in both supports military intervention, 5% of Europeans (EU9) and 15% of Americans.
- More Americans than Europeans think they will be personally affected by international terrorism (71% to 53%), while more Europeans see themselves as likely to be personally affected by global warming (73% to 64%).
- Americans remain divided on the Bush presidency, but attitudes on foreign policy show agreement among Democrats and Republicans on “hard” threats like the spread of nuclear weapons and terrorism. More Democrats than Republicans see themselves as likely to be personally affected by global warming and the spread of AIDS.
- Democrats support President Bush’s policies to improve relations with Europe more strongly than Republicans, with 67% of Democrats who agree that relations with the EU should become closer, compared to 34% of Republicans.



## TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

### *Section One: Transatlantic Relationship and Views of Second Bush Term*

The re-election of George W. Bush in 2004 raised concerns for some that transatlantic relations would remain strained after tensions over the war in Iraq. Yet at the outset of its second term, the Bush administration undertook an ambitious diplomatic effort to change the tone and improve relations with Europe. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Paris in February 2005, and President Bush traveled to Europe three times in the first six months of his second term. He became the first American President to officially visit the European Union, declaring in Brussels, “The alliance of Europe and North America is the main pillar of our security.” Were these efforts successful? Given tensions in recent years, has there been an increase in

anti-Americanism as some anticipated? Are Americans and Europeans ready to work together again?

#### EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION UNMOVED BY BUSH EFFORTS TO MEND RELATIONS

Despite major diplomatic efforts to mend transatlantic relations, there has been little change in European public opinion toward the United States. When asked whether relations between the United States and Europe have improved, gotten worse, or stayed the same, in light of President Bush’s recent efforts to improve relations with Europe, 52% of Europeans (EU9) felt relations have stayed the same. Americans agreed, with 50% saying relations have stayed the same. Among those who saw change,




Chart 1

more Germans and Slovaks felt relations have improved, while more British, Italians, Dutch, and Spaniards felt relations have gotten worse. (See chart #1 on page 5)

**AMERICANS WANT CLOSER RELATIONS,  
EUROPEANS WANT TO BE MORE INDEPENDENT**

When asked whether relations *should* become closer, remain the same, or become more independent in security and diplomatic affairs, the majority of Americans (54%) felt that relations should become closer, whereas a similar percentage of Europeans (EU9 55%) felt the EU should take a more independent approach from the United States. Both sides saw a small increase of 5 percentage points from 2004 in the number of respondents who want to take a more independent approach, from 20% to 25% in the United States and from 50% to 55% in Europe (EU9). Within Europe, the largest percentages of respondents who felt relations should become closer were in Poland (48%), Spain (43%), and

Slovakia (35%), whereas the largest percentages who felt relations should take a more independent approach were in France (69%), Italy (66%), and the Netherlands (62%).

**NO EVIDENCE OF INCREASED ANTI-AMERICANISM**

At the same time, there is no evidence of increased anti-Americanism. Europeans continue to distinguish their feelings about President Bush from their evaluations of the United States taking a leading role in world affairs. While 72% of Europeans disapprove of the way President Bush is handling international policies, a lower percentage (59%) feel that U.S. global leadership is undesirable (these percentages remain relatively unchanged from 2004). While these numbers are surely more negative than Americans may like, they suggest that Europeans' negative feelings remain focused on the current administration, not on the United States more generally. (See chart #2)




Chart 2




Chart 3

**EUROPEANS CONTINUE TO HAVE MODERATELY WARM FEELINGS TOWARD UNITED STATES**

As a whole, Europeans continue to have moderately warm feelings toward the United States, with a thermometer reading of 50 on a scale of 1-100. Exceptions to the overall absence of change were the British, whose warmth toward the United States decreased from 62 to 57 degrees and Italians, whose warmth decreased from 61 to 57 degrees. By contrast, Americans gave their European allies more positive evaluations, with thermometer readings of 60 or above for Germany, Spain, the UK and Italy. Americans' warmth toward France increased for the second year in a row, going from 45 degrees in 2003 to 53 degrees in 2005. (See chart #3)

**VARYING VIEWS OF U.S. PARTNERSHIP IN GERMANY**

Forty-nine percent of Germans who identify themselves with the political right and 54% of those who




Chart 4

identify with the center feel that the U.S.-EU partnership should become closer or remain the same, whereas only 29% of the German left agrees. Similarly, while German support for NATO as a whole has declined from 74% in 2002 to 59% in 2005, support for NATO today among the German right (62%) and center (64%) remains higher than on the left (53%).

**TURKEY MOST CRITICAL OF U.S. BUT STILL SUPPORTIVE OF NATO**

As in 2004, Turkish respondents remain the most strongly critical of President Bush's leadership, with 63% disapproving very much of President Bush's international policies. At the same time, Turkish support for NATO continues to be positive and essentially unchanged from past years, with 52% of respondents agreeing that NATO is "still essential to our country's security."



## Section Two: What Future for the European Union?

The failed referenda on the EU constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands sparked a widespread perception of crisis that some fear will turn the EU inward, away from enlargement and engagement with global problems. Although our survey did not ask directly about the constitutional treaty, we can evaluate European attitudes toward reasons often given for the failed referenda, as well as attitudes toward the future. We found that the failed referenda were not accompanied by significantly cooler feelings toward the EU, nor by a weaker desire for the EU to become a superpower like the United States. In addition, we probed deeper this year on attitudes toward the EU as a superpower to better understand European perceptions of military and economic power.

### FAILED REFERENDA ON CONSTITUTION WAS NOT REJECTION OF THE EU

Our data suggest that the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands were not the result of a rejection of the EU or of the European integration project more generally. Europeans continue to have strongly positive feelings about the EU with an average of 67 degrees on a scale of 1 to 100 among current EU members, down only slightly from 70 degrees in 2004. (See chart #4 on page 7, and chart #5)

Frequent explanations for the referenda rejections included fears of immigration and economic crisis. Strikingly, by cross-tabulating our data we found that Europeans who saw themselves as more likely to be




Chart 5

personally affected by immigration do not have significantly cooler feelings toward the EU, with a mean thermometer reading of 66 on a scale of 1 to 100, nearly identical to the EU average of 67. Similarly, Europeans (EU9) who saw themselves as more likely to be personally affected by economic downturn also do not have significantly cooler feelings toward the EU, with a mean thermometer reading identical to the EU average at 67.

### IS ENLARGEMENT THE ISSUE?

Did the referenda rejections reflect concerns about the potential accession of Turkey? While the percentage of Europeans who believe that Turkish membership in the EU would be a bad thing has increased since last year, even in Turkey, the largest percentage of Europeans in the EU (42%) remain ambivalent, seeing it as neither good nor bad. Of those with an opinion, those who support Turkish membership agree that the benefits for the EU are economic (77%) and greater peace and security in the Middle East (83%). Further investigation would be needed to explain why those

who do not support Turkish membership do so, as they rejected the assertion that Turkey is too Muslim, too poor, or too populous. (See chart #6)

Others have suggested that the referenda rejections reflected a negative view toward further integration after the recent enlargement, which brought in countries more pro-American and skeptical toward the EU. We found little support for this in the two new member states surveyed, with the average thermometer reading for the United States in Poland at 56 degrees and in Slovakia at 55 degrees, both only slightly higher than the EU average of 53. Similarly, the average thermometer reading for the EU in Poland was 61 degrees, slightly below the EU average of 67, and in Slovakia was 73 degrees, slightly higher.

### FRENCH AND GERMANS SUPPORT SINGLE EU SEAT ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL

Given the current debate on UN reform, Germany's push for a permanent seat on the Security Council, and the EU's increasing role in world affairs, we asked Europeans if the EU should have a single permanent




Chart 6

seat, even if it replaces the permanent seats of France and the UK. Strikingly, 60% agreed, including 62% of French and 64% of German respondents. Only the UK disagreed, with 55% opposed. (See chart #7)

### DIFFERING VIEWS ON EU “SUPERPOWER”

As in past years, 70% of Europeans agreed that the EU should become a superpower like the United States. Of those, only 44% continue to agree if becoming a superpower requires greater military spending (percentages virtually unchanged from 2004). These results raise critical questions: do Europeans have different understandings of “superpower” and believe that they should focus on economic, rather than military power? This year, we asked additional questions to probe attitudes toward being a superpower and found that one-fourth (26%) of Europeans see the EU as a civilian superpower, in that they do not believe the EU should increase its military strength and want the EU to concentrate on economic power. However, the largest percentage of those who want the EU to become a superpower (35%) believe that the EU should increase military spending, while valuing military and economic power.

### WORRIES ABOUT UNEMPLOYMENT LIMIT SUPPORT FOR SINGLE ARMY

Concerns about unemployment also limit Europeans’ willingness to combine their national military forces into a single army. While a small majority of Europeans (55%) agree that the countries of the European Union should combine their military forces into a single army even if their home country may not always agree with EU decisions, only 39% of Europeans agree if this may cost jobs in their home countries.

### TURKEY SKEPTICAL OF THE EU BUT IN FAVOR OF JOINING

Even after being invited last year to open accession negotiations with the EU, Turkey remains skeptical. Compared to 70% of current EU members, only 41% of Turks want the EU to become a superpower like the United States. While a large majority of Turks (73%) agree that Turkey’s membership in the EU would be good for Turkey in economic terms, the percentage of those who view membership in the EU as a good thing has declined from 73% in 2004 to 63% in 2005.




Chart 7



## TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

### *Section Three: Democracy Promotion*

“The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands,” George W. Bush declared in his second inaugural address, setting democracy promotion as the centerpiece of his foreign policy in his second term. Democracy promotion has deep roots in the twentieth century, perhaps most notably in the Marshall Plan post-war reconstruction of Europe. After the end of the Cold War, the EU’s enlargement policy played an influential role in Central and Eastern Europe supporting the consolidation of new democracies. Yet continued controversy over Iraq, with inspiring parliamentary elections as well as persistent violence, raised questions about the understanding and support for such policies. We probed American and European support for democracy promotion by asking, in addition to their general attitudes, whether they would support specific policy options, from monitoring elections to military intervention. We also sought to gauge whether support for democracy promotion extends to countries like China where the United States and Europe have strategic and economic interests.

#### **MORE EUROPEANS THAN AMERICANS SUPPORT DEMOCRACY PROMOTION**

Asked if it should be the role of the EU to help establish democracy in other countries, an overwhelming majority of Europeans (74%) agreed, whereas 51% of Americans agreed that the U.S. should do so. A breakdown of the U.S. data by political affiliation reveals a strong partisan divide: seventy-six percent of Republicans support democracy promotion, compared




Chart 8




Chart 9

to 43% of Democrats. On this issue, Republican attitudes more closely mirror those of Europeans than Democrats. (See chart #8 and chart #9 on page 11)

### **STRONG PREFERENCE FOR “SOFT POWER” TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY**

Americans and Europeans were asked whether they would support one or more of six policy options to promote democracy: monitoring elections; supporting independent groups like trade unions, human rights associations, and religious groups; imposing political sanctions; imposing economic sanctions; supporting dissidents; and sending military forces. On both sides of the Atlantic, support decreased with the severity or intrusiveness of the action. Monitoring elections received the highest support at 83% of Europeans and 68% of Americans, while support for military intervention was lowest at 32% of Europeans and 39% of Americans. While both parties in the United States support soft power options, nearly twice as many Republicans (57%) as Democrats (29%) support military intervention. (See charts #11 and chart #12 on page 13)

### **EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS AGREE HUMAN RIGHTS MATTER IN CHINA**

Does European and American support for democracy promotion, such as the defense of human rights, extend to cases where both sides have economic interests, such as China? As Europeans and Americans look to deepen economic relations with China, there is agreement that human rights should be taken into consideration. A slim majority on both sides of the Atlantic agree that the U.S. (52%) and EU (54%) should limit economic relations with China because of human rights violations. (See chart #10)




Chart 10




Chart 11




Chart 12



## Section Four: The United States in the Second Bush Term

Many wondered about the persistence of partisan divisions in the United States after the re-election of President Bush, while European difficulties in understanding the United States seemed likely to continue. These concerns compel us to return to a number of questions from *Transatlantic Trends 2004* where we found that in many cases Democrats had views more similar to Europeans than to Republicans. Six months into the second term, Americans remain divided on the Bush presidency, but partisanship does not entirely explain foreign policy attitudes. As in past years, Democrats' views toward international institutions like the United Nations were more positive than Republicans and closer to European views. Yet Democrats and Republicans agree on significant issues like support for the United States' leading role in the world and the perception of hard threats like terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons. On democracy promotion, as noted in section three, it is Republicans whose views are closer to Europeans than Democrats.

### AMERICANS REMAIN DIVIDED AFTER 2004 ELECTION

While 84% of Americans agree that the United States should exert strong leadership in the world, Americans continue to be divided about the way President Bush is handling international affairs. In 2004, a slight majority approved of President Bush's handling of international policy with 51% approval to 47% disapproval, whereas in 2005, attitudes are evenly divided, with 48% approval to 49% disapproval. (See chart #13)

The divisions within America have partisan roots. Overwhelming majorities of both major parties (82%

of Democrats and 90% of Republicans) agree that the United States should exert strong leadership in world affairs, but they diverge about the way President Bush is handling international policies: eighty-five percent of Republicans and only 18% of Democrats approve. These percentages remain unchanged from 2004.

### DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS AGREE ON HARD THREATS

Democrats and Republicans do not always divide neatly along party lines on foreign policy attitudes. Both parties tend to agree on the danger posed by "hard" threats like the spread of nuclear weapons and international terrorism,




Chart 13




Chart 14

whereas Democrats see themselves as more likely to be personally affected by global warming and the spread of AIDS. (See chart #14)

cooperate or compete with the United States: a majority of Democrats (55%) think a more powerful EU would cooperate, whereas the same percentage of Republicans think a more powerful EU would compete.

**PARTIES DIVIDE ON SUPPORT FOR CLOSER RELATIONS WITH EU**

Democrats support President Bush’s policies to improve transatlantic relations more strongly than Republicans but are more critical of the results. Sixty-seven percent of Democrats feel that relations with the EU should become closer, compared to 34% of Republicans. Yet, those in both parties who see a change in relations come to different conclusions: whereas 30% of Republicans say relations have improved, only 13% of Democrats agree. (See chart #15)

**BOTH PARTIES WANT EUROPEAN UNION TO EXERT STRONG LEADERSHIP**

A large majority of both parties—76% of Democrats and 69% of Republicans—see it as desirable that the EU exert strong leadership in world affairs. They disagree, however, on whether a more powerful EU would




Chart 15



### *Section Five: Facing Global Problems*

The key question facing the United States and Europe for many observers is not whether transatlantic relations are warm but whether the United States and Europe can constructively face global problems together. We have seen in previous sections that a large majority of Europeans and Americans want the EU to play a leading role in international affairs. Would an EU “superpower” cooperate with the United States? As the EU becomes more engaged in the international sphere, have attitudes toward NATO changed? Do Americans and Europeans perceive global threats similarly? Can the United States and Europe agree on pressing concerns such as the nuclear threat posed by Iran?

#### **LARGE MAJORITY OF EUROPEANS WANT EU TO COOPERATE WITH U.S.**

While 55% of Europeans (EU9) want to take a more independent approach in security and diplomatic affairs, this does not imply competing with the United States. On the contrary, our data show that a large majority (80%) of Europeans (EU9) want a more powerful EU to cooperate rather than compete with the United States. (See chart #16)




Chart 16

#### **NATO STILL ESSENTIAL FOR MAJORITIES IN U.S. AND EUROPE**

As the EU considers a more global role, many have wondered if NATO will continue to serve as a key forum for transatlantic security cooperation. Support for NATO in Europe and the United States remains high, with a small decline on both sides in 2005 (from 61% to 56% in Europe and from 62% to 60% in the United States). The most notable changes in the past three years have been in Germany and Italy, where support for NATO has declined from 74% and 68% in 2002 to 59% and 52% in 2005, respectively. (See chart #17, next page)




Chart 17

**AMERICANS MORE LIKELY TO FEEL THREATENED BY TERRORISM, EUROPEANS BY GLOBAL WARMING**

In past surveys, we found that Americans and Europeans ranked the importance of global threats remarkably similar in the abstract. This year, we probed further and asked how likely they felt they were to be personally affected by the same threats. Notably, Americans feel significantly more likely to be *personally* affected by terrorism (71% vs. 53% of Europeans), by the spread of nuclear weapons (67% vs. 55% of Europeans), and by Islamic fundamentalism (50% vs. 40% of Europeans). More Americans also feel themselves likely to be personally affected by immigration (61% vs. 51% of Europeans). Europeans, by contrast, feel more likely to be personally affected by the effects of global warming (73% vs. 64% of Americans). (See chart #18 on page 18)

**AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS UNCERTAIN ABOUT IRAN**

In recent months, the United States and EU have sought to coordinate policies concerning the possibility that Iran may develop nuclear weapons. At present, there appears to be no consensus in the United States or Europe on the available policy options. Europeans show a greater preference for diplomatic pressure (EU9 41%) over economic incentives (EU9 30%) and economic sanctions (EU9 18%), while Americans remain equally divided at about 25% for each option. Only a small minority in both cases supports military action, 5% of Europeans (EU9) and 15% of Americans. (See chart #19 on page 18)




Chart 18




Chart 19



## TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

### *Conclusion*

Six months after George W. Bush's reelection, at a time of introspection in the EU, the rift between the United States and Europe has not widened but appears to be taking longer to close than many hoped. The absence of movement in European public opinion after the Bush administration's diplomatic efforts highlights the need for public diplomacy in addition to the elite summits earlier this year. The arrival of a new undersecretary for public diplomacy may launch renewed efforts this fall to reach out to allies and the rest of the world.

Other polls suggested that the London bombings on July 7, 2005 have at least temporarily increased Europeans' perceptions of the threat of terrorism.<sup>2</sup> While we cannot say whether this will persist, we have seen continued efforts at closer cooperation between the United States and EU on homeland security.

Notably, U.S. Secretary for Homeland Security Michael Chertoff made his first official visit overseas to Brussels to meet with Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Democracy promotion may offer the greatest potential for transatlantic cooperation. Despite criticism among European elites, public support for democracy promotion elicits considerable agreement on both sides of the Atlantic. Recent diplomatic coordination between the United States and Europe surrounding political change in Ukraine and Lebanon highlights the potential for agreement and cooperation. While Europeans may not be likely to send additional troops into Iraq, we might hope that the United States and Europe continue to work together on common challenges in Afghanistan, Iran, the Greater Middle East, and China.

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<sup>2</sup>See "The Next Target?" *The Economist*, July 16, 2005, pages 44-45.



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

*Notes*





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