The West’s Secret Energy Weapon
Russia’s manipulation of European gas supplies and its attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure have redefined energy security as hybrid warfare. In response, NATO and the EU are bolstering defense capabilities, enhancing undersea surveillance, and pushing to diversify energy sources to eliminate dependence on Moscow.
But beyond policy shifts, another hidden but vital layer of defense has emerged: energy traders. These are private firms that move fuel across borders, broker deals in conflict zones, and act swiftly when the grid fails.
As governments deliberate the handling of crises, these companies often act as first responders. In emergencies, such as the assault on Ukraine’s embattled power grid, firms such as DTEK, BGN International, and ADNOC have stepped in with speed, money, and logistical skill. Their efforts have ensured fuel flows, rebuilt infrastructure, and strengthened Europe’s energy autonomy and that of its partners.
DTEK has emerged as a key player in Ukraine’s survival. Russian attacks have damaged more than 90% of the country’s power capacity, but the company has restored lines, sourced emergency parts, and kept electricity flowing. Its engineers, working under fire, have become critical actors in keeping society running. In recognition of this achievement, Western governments have provided direct funding and equipment—an unusual but significant nod to the private sector’s role in wartime resilience.
In conflict-torn Libya, Switzerland-based firm BGN International sustained power generation by bartering crude for refined fuels, an improvised solution and a modern echo of the UN’s Oil-for-Food program in Iraq during the 1990s. That initiative has helped stave off humanitarian collapse at a time when the organization is imposing international sanctions on the country.
Meanwhile, as Europe rushed to replace Russian gas, private traders and national oil firms acted faster than EU coordination. ADNOC, Abu Dhabi’s state oil company, quickly delivered emergency liquefied national gas (LNG) cargoes to Germany’s new floating terminals, positioning the Gulf as a key alternative supplier. Beyond fuel, ADNOC made strategic investments in European industry, most notably its $16 billion takeover of Covestro, a German sustainable chemicals leader essential to the automotive and green tech sectors. Even more ambitious is ADNOC’s planned $60 billion merger with Austria’s OMV, an effort to form one of the world’s largest polyolefin producers. The polymer is crucial for packaging and aerospace. These moves are part of ADNOC’s $150 billion capital plan through 2027, which is designed to link Gulf energy production with European reindustrialization, strengthen transatlantic supply chains, and deepen Gulf-Europe ties in critical sectors.
These cases blur the traditional line between state and market on issues related to security. In today’s age of hybrid threats, energy companies have evolved beyond commercial entities. They are now geopolitical actors whose operations span economic, financial, diplomatic, and informational spheres of national power. They diversify supply routes, build infrastructure rapidly, and respond first to sabotage, cyberattacks, and blockades. In doing so, they play a direct role in strengthening the resilience of NATO and EU member states.
Europe’s ability to navigate the 2022 energy crisis highlights this shift. Energy traders rerouted LNG from the United States, Qatar, and Nigeria; managed fuel swaps; and supported the record-fast construction of new terminals. Germany’s first floating gas terminal, completed in just 200 days, showed how fast-tracked permits combined with private capital and expertise can rapidly reshape energy security. These actions also bought policymakers time to roll out initiatives such as REPowerEU and joint gas purchasing frameworks.
Private companies are also key to deterrence. Investments in pipelines, terminals, and storage hubs enhance Europe’s ability to withstand coercion. When firms such as BGN International raise credit to operate in fragile states or ADNOC increases shipping capacity and redundancy, they are expanding strategic options while enhancing Western flexibility.
As these companies’ importance grows, NATO and the EU must better integrate them into strategic planning. Existing efforts, such as the NATO-EU Joint Task Force on Resilience and Operation Baltic Sentry, offer a foundation. But they should be expanded with threat-sharing platforms, joint war games, and resilience exercises that bring together energy traders with military and regulatory actors. Just as defense planners simulate cyberattacks, energy companies should participate in testing infrastructure recovery and disruption response for heightened resilience.
Policy must also encourage investment in redundancy, interoperability, and rapid repair. Governments should co-fund infrastructure with civilian and strategic utility, especially interconnectors, LNG terminals, and distributed renewables. Ukraine’s pivot toward decentralized energy, often underwritten by private capital, is a compelling model for hardening infrastructure in the face of hybrid warfare.
Crucially, energy firms must also be brought into strategic dialogue at the technical level and within policy-shaping forums. These platforms should include voices from trading desks, engineering teams, and risk managers. Insights from the field on fuel rerouting, cyber defense, and grid recovery, are essential to future NATO-EU coordination and energy diplomacy.
In a world in which infrastructure is a battlefield, energy companies are no longer peripheral. They are frontline actors whose speed, investment, and expertise are vital to transatlantic security and resilience.