The Well-Known Unknown
All polls pointed to that result, and the support of outgoing President Klaus Iohannis was an advantage. But Ciolacu came in third, a result that ousts him from the election’s second and final round on December 8.
The outcome is, in part, due to the PSD’s attempt to raise the profile of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), a relatively moderate party among those on the extreme right. The strategy was designed to ensure a second round that would guarantee a PSD victory while setting the stage for a coalition partner alternative. But the strategy backfired. It fueled instead the anti-establishment vote for the openly pro-Russian Calin Georgescu. The candidate, who has no party and ran a campaign almost entirely on social media, won the first round. The leader of the progressive United Save Romania party (USR), Elena Lasconi, eked out second place just ahead of Ciolacu.
The surprise result appears to reflect massive Russian influence along the lines of what was seen in the recent presidential election in neighboring Moldova. No one in Romania saw this coming, a major failure of political elites and analysts, and independent and mainstream media. Limited civil-society resources for countering disinformation, and complacency among international funders of civic initiatives, which could have done more to prop up defenses against malign foreign interference, are also to blame. This all left Romania in a far weaker position than Moldova to counter foreign interference.
In addition, no police investigations were launched into the thousands of TikTok videos posted by voters showing themselves casting ballots for Georgescu, although that is a criminal offense under Romania’s electoral code. This suggests little capacity to address similar violations on social media ahead of the next round of voting.
Georgescu, who has called Ukraine an “invented state” and said Romania would benefit from closer ties with Russia and China, is now in a strong position to win the election. There are also indications that the December 1 parliamentary vote will bring a strong presence of pro-Russian and pro-Chinese forces into the chamber as the presidential race result reflects the inability of mainstream parties to pursue the grassroots concerns of an impoverished population. That these parties’ leaders have personally benefitted from their positions of power is also a strike against them.
The Options Now
For the presidential election’s second round, Lasconi may well mobilize urban voters, the private sector, and civil society actors. She has already garnered the support of the mainstream National Liberal Party, but where the votes and political machines of the other mainstream parties will land is completely unknown. This is the first time in Romania’ post-Communist history that no mainstream party has a candidate in the second round.
Ominously, the self-proclaimed “sovereigntist pole” of extreme right, pro-Russian parties is closing ranks in the presidential and parliamentary races. The AUR has endorsed Georgescu (former AUR honorary president) in the former, and their collaboration puts them in a better position to do well in the latter, possibly capturing between one-third and one-half of seats. Such a result could allow the extreme right to govern if Georgescu becomes president.
Should Lasconi manage to emerge victorious, however, the governing coalition will likely be center right and pro-European under the leadership of her USR. The choice could not be starker.