Untangling the Transatlantic Knot: Germany, France, and the United States

France’s and Germany’s reactions to Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine reveal their significantly different relationships with the United States. Their interpretations regarding the European security architecture are almost diametrically opposed. While Berlin concluded that European security must be constructed transatlantically, Paris saw confirmation of its interpretation that Europeans must be able to address security challenges independently of Washington. Donald Trump’s re-election constitutes a challenge for the two countries because both need to fundamentally rethink their respective relationships with the United States and Europe-US relations more generally. The scope of the US withdrawal from European security remains to be seen, but it will be similarly challenging for Paris and Berlin.

Historical continuity 

The differences in Germany’s and France’s respective relationships with the United States have remained remarkably stable since the end of WWII. German foreign and security policy was shaped by the division of Germany and the rearmament of the federal armed forces within NATO in the 1950s. In contrast, differentiation from the United States and a collective “West” became a golden thread through France’s foreign policy, catalyzed by tensions regarding strategy in the Indo-China war, the Suez crisis, and the signature of the Evian treaties. Once Paris developed a separate nuclear capability, the withdrawal from NATO’s military command sealed the French special path. 

While “never again” and “never alone again” became guiding principles in Germany’s foreign policy in the following decades, and remain relevant today, the idea of sovereignty remains a key concept of French foreign policy. When taking office in 2017, French President Macron attempted to Europeanize the French understanding of European sovereignty. From his Sorbonne speech in 2017 to a speech at the Ecole de Guerre (Military School, 2020) and his second Sorbonne speech in 2024, Macron increasingly called upon Europeans to enhance their autonomy in light of the shifts in the global order. These calls also emphasized the importance of independence from the United States. Examples include the “brain dead” comments regarding NATO in 2019 or an interview following Macron’s visit to China in 2023. These sparked outrage among many EU partners and especially in transatlantic circles in Berlin. 

The debates on a stronger European engagement for European security have repeatedly fallen back to positions that are outdated in political practice, with those advocating for close ties with the United States and a transatlantic Europe on the one side, and advocates of a sovereign (Gaullist) Europe on the other. 

What’s next? 

The re-election of Donald Trump forces Germany and France to rethink their respective transatlantic relations and Euro-American relations more generally. Berlin and Paris can together create a strong basis for a European transatlantic strategy. 

Rethinking transatlantic relations

The continuing disputes regarding sovereignty demonstrate the gap between European debates and the changing realities of the international order. Ahead of the US elections, Berlin shut down the French attempts to prepare for all potential outcomes, especially a re-election of Trump, to avoid offending their transatlantic partner. The same argument was made in debates about granting the United States access to the European defense market and in discussions of the European dimension of French nuclear weapons. Even today, the misconception that Washington was wary of European sovereignty prevails in Berlin. Some German officials seem to have missed the fact that MAGA Republicans, isolationists, and those calling for prioritizing China have repeatedly demanded that Europeans embrace sovereignty. 

A second explanation for Berlin’s insistence on a long-outdated position is its reluctance to engage in tough debates on European security. Its concerns about the US reaction to the Russian attack reveal its inability to even think about European security without US guarantees. A shift in mentality is required, and perhaps also a generational one. Accusing advocates of a sovereign Europe of turning away from NATO, the West, and the United States poisons the debate. Furthermore, it prevents strategic preparation for worst-case scenarios, in which Trump might implement his threats to leave Europe on its own. 

France has, historically, less reluctance to plan in a sovereign manner, independently of the White House. Although this approach is a strength for national security, it significantly hampers the European debate. The term “sovereignty” has so significantly marked the foreign and security policy of the Fifth Republic that European partners barely trust Macron’s attempts to Europeanize France’s understanding of the term. French politicians, diplomats, and military staff continue to be accused of implicitly referring to national French interests when talking about “European interests”. 

Against the background of Trump’s second term and the historic evolution of transatlantic relations in France and Germany, the positions emerging in Paris and Berlin appear ready to be adapted and combined for added value on the European level: Berlin’s outdated strategic immaturity dating from the Cold War, together with its lack of political will to act autonomously, and Paris’ outdated confidence in itself as a great power. If the new German government succeeds in quickly establishing a relationship of trust with Macron, a work program for a European transatlantic strategy could form the core of joint foreign policy initiatives for Macron’s remaining two years in office. 

Europeanize NATO 

There is no alternative to Europeanizing NATO. The new US administration will be much more demanding when it comes to European defense spending and responsibility for European security. Europeans must take the military and strategic lead if they want to preserve NATO. In Republican circles, the idea of a “dormant NATO” is gaining traction, and members of the Democratic Party, who see the Indo-Pacific as the United States’ foreign policy priority, are sympathetic to this idea. Instead of aiming for full withdrawal of the United States from European security, this model implies that Washington contributes to European security via the nuclear umbrella and maritime capabilities, whereas Europeans manage logistics, weaponry, and infantry. France and Germany could contribute to designing the burden-sharing within the alliance in a way that makes continuous engagement an added value for Washington. While France cannot hope to replace the US nuclear umbrella, Paris should open a European nuclear dialogue. Germany should actively participate. Berlin should live up to its ambition to play a leading role in European air defense, for example through transforming the European SkyShield initiative into a NATO initiative. Within the EU, France and Germany should collectively push for massive financial support for European capabilities and the European defense industry, and thereby design a central role for the EU in the European pillar in NATO. As a logical consequence, the post of the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) should be occupied by a European; France and Germany should express their willingness to take this responsibility. 

Avoid bilateralization and strengthen the EU’s role

Bilateralization of transatlantic relations, whether emanating from Europe or the United States, is a serious risk under the Trump administration. Trump might seek bilateral “deals” instead of working with the EU, and European states might be tempted to negotiate individual benefits in the relationship with Washington. It is easy to imagine that the United States could make especially Eastern European and Baltic states align by conditioning security guarantees on support for Washington’s approach to China. This would significantly complicate a European approach. As the biggest EU member states, France and Germany have a special responsibility to avoid bilateralization. They should lead by example and systematically include at least the respective partner country and the EU leadership, and potentially also the heads of government of the United Kingdom, Italy, and Poland, in exchanges with Trump that touch on European issues. Furthermore, Germany and France should push for strengthening the role of the EU in European security, for instance through EU-NATO cooperation and by emphasizing the added value of the EU for the alliance. 

Recommendations

Germany and France must play a central role in reshaping transatlantic relations. If they succeed in coordinating their approaches, their differing strengths will become their biggest asset. 

Germany: 

• The German narrative regarding strategic cooperation with France must change. Deeper cooperation with France has been increasingly ruled out because of France’s uncertain domestic and foreign policy trajectory and also because Germany would not want to create the same strategic dependencies with a potential Le Pen government. Germany must undoubtedly do more for its own security, but German security is European security, and the natural partner to strengthen it is France. The two countries cannot escape geography. Further delaying deeper security cooperation with France will close a window of opportunity and equip the French political extremes with new arguments against Macron’s policy. 
• The new German government needs an answer to Macron’s 2017 Sorbonne speech. One of Angela Merkel’s biggest foreign policy failures was the lack of an answer to it. Olaf Scholz did not perform better, as he failed to respond to Macron’s second Sorbonne speech in April 2024. European partners, and especially France, need clarity regarding Germany’s Europe policy: beyond individual measures, Berlin needs a vision for the future of the EU and the European continent. The objective of this endeavor should not consist in uncritically repeating French proposals, but in forming a basis for a debate on Europe’s future. 
• Germany should accept the offer of a “strategic dialogue” on the European dimension of nuclear arms on the highest political level, meaning between the new chancellor and the French president. Paris needs a strong signal that Germany understands the urgency of this topic. 

France 

• Macron must go “all in” with his proposals to strengthen European sovereignty. The so-called Bratislava agenda, through which France has confirmed its “strategic solidarity” with Ukraine and eastern European EU and NATO partners, has created the conceptual base for this endeavor. France should resolutely focus its security policy on Europe. This approach requires adaptation of the French Ministry of Defense’s personnel policy regarding the filling of NATO positions. 
• The continuing withdrawal of French soldiers from the African continent constitutes an opportunity for France to completely rethink and modernize French foreign and security policy. A key test will be France’s shift away from an unrealistic ambition as a third power, next to China and the United States, in the Indo-Pacific. If Macron succeeds in initiating and positively framing this process in Paris, this constitutes a unique chance for France to move closer to Washington and normalize France’s position within the collective West. 
• France must urgently improve its understanding of the specificities of German security policy. The call for a “Zeitenwende” triggered high hopes in Paris, but it was often viewed through the lens of French interests, as reflected in calls for stronger differentiation from the United States and a Europeanization of German security policy. Instead of judging the action of a new German government on the basis of maximum demands, France would be well advised to value the progress made in Germany and actively support it. Rather than seeking public confrontation, exchange programs related to security policy and existing formats should be used to start a true strategic dialogue. France is changing just as rapidly as Germany with regard to security policy, and both sides have some explaining to do.
   

For joint action: 

• The cooperation of the German and French troop contributions at NATO’s eastern flank, meaning the German brigade in Lithuania and the French troops in Romania, should be improved through regular exchange on the military leadership level. Furthermore, a Franco-German posting model, which would allow soldiers to spend time in the partner’s deployment, could foster the mutual understanding of the deployment areas of NATO troops and the partner’s strategic culture. 
• Similar to the close bilateral coordination ahead of EU summit meetings, France and Germany should seek close coordination ahead of talks with the new US administration and within the Permanent Representations to NATO ahead of meetings of the North Atlantic Council. This step would allow Paris and Berlin to drive a coordinated European position. 
• The EU lacks a transatlantic strategy. Questions related to transatlantic relations have too often been pushed into NATO on the European level. Germany and France can initiate this process and elaborate first ideas together with the new EU Commission and the Polish presidency of the Council of the EU.