Ukrainian Defense Procurement Needs Stability, Not Chaos
The first article can be found here.
In the weeks since Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced a legally dubious decision to nullify the supervisory board of the DPA by refusing to renew the contract of the DPA’s reputable leader, Maryna Bezrukova, the situation in Kyiv has descended into open turf warfare.
On one side, Bezrukova refused to leave her post and appealed to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Bezrukova’s name was removed from the state registry even though she had not been officially dismissed by ministerial decree but only placed on temporary leave. At the same time, the G7 ambassadors in Kyiv called for a swift resolution consistent with good governance and NATO recommendations, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) opened an investigation into Umerov’s abuse of power, and the governing party’s head of the parliamentary anti-corruption committee called upon Umerov to resign.
For his part, immediately after his public announcement about not renewing Bezrukova’s contract, Umerov replaced her with Arsen Zhumadilov, the head of Ukraine’s smaller non-lethal procurement agency. But that outcome was not officially settled until several days later, after the name recorded in the state enterprise register as the leader of the DPA changed a remarkable five times: back and forth from Bezrukova to Zhumadilov and back again, and again, and again, ending with Zhumadilov in charge.
Over the next several days, instead of working to get more weapons to the front, international donor officials, allied diplomats, Ukrainian contracting officers, and DPA leaders themselves were constantly refreshing their web browsers to see who was in charge of defense procurement. Yet the main cost of this circus is not a week’s worth of lost time that should have been spent cultivating donors, verifying sellers, signing contracts, making payments, taking custody, and delivering weapons to the Armed Forces of Ukraine; rather, it is the potential for the tarnished trust in Ukraine’s defense procurement governance to fuel hesitation and skepticism among all domestic and international stakeholders in a well-defended Ukraine. It is no surprise that Russian propagandists have gleefully fanned the flames of this chaotic story.
The fifth and final update to state registry came only when Umerov issued an order formally dismissing Bezrukova from her position, a full week after her initial removal from the registry. But the situation remains unstable. The legally questionable method of appointing an acting director—over the objections of the supervisory board—has disrupted DPA operations, posing risks to the pace of procurement, rapid contracting, and international financing for Ukrainian defense manufacturers.
A Way Out: A Law Ensuring Stability
The illegal nullification of the supervisory board’s authority by Umerov to turn back the clock on institutional reforms and sideline reformers points to the urgent need for a special law governing the two (lethal and non-lethal) defense procurement agencies—a law that would enshrine their independence through legally binding provisions. Such a law should include clear guarantees of their autonomous operations, prevent dissolution by executive order, prohibit unilateral dismissals of leadership, and establish protections against political interference. However, no concrete initiative to develop such a law has been formulated, and there is no clear vision of what it should entail. The parliamentary defense committee, which should be a key stakeholder in this process, along with the Ministry of Defense, has not started drafting such legislation or working on its content. As a result, the future of the DPA and the structure of its role in the defense procurement system remain uncertain.
Ukraine already has specialized legislation regulating state-owned enterprises, defining the powers of supervisory boards, and establishing principles for corporate governance. What is needed is a clear framework for managing the defense procurement enterprises and defining their legal status.
A special law on the organization and operation of the DPA and the non-lethal agency is necessary, as these enterprises perform unique functions, manage substantial budgets, and are critically important to the front lines. At the same time, they are not traditional state-owned businesses engaged in commercial activities for profit. They are, in essence, state tools delegated to carry out specific functions of the Ministry of Defense, requiring additional guarantees of stability and protection.
However, even if such a law is drafted and passed, its implementation could take over a year. Based on Ukraine’s past experiences, establishing such mechanisms is a lengthy process. Even after a law is adopted, considerable time will be needed to form supervisory boards, hold competitive selection processes for leadership positions, and fully launch agency operations.
Given this, the situation must be stabilized immediately. First and foremost, the legality of the DPA’s functioning must be ensured so that its director has the legal authority to sign contracts and the supervisory board can carry out its functions without obstruction.
Since the situation has reached a deadlock, it is imperative that the agencies’ statutes be aligned with existing Ukrainian legislation. The Ministry of Defense must promptly nominate government representatives to the supervisory board, which, in turn, must immediately launch an independent audit, appoint an acting DPA director, and initiate a competitive selection process for the next head of the agency. Any delay will only exacerbate political chaos, enable a return to corrupt practices of the past, further erode the confidence of international partners, and weaken Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Thus, the immediate implementation of these actions should be an absolute priority for all key stakeholders.