Ukraine: A Good Deal

A good deal to end the war in Ukraine would deter Russia from attacking its neighbor again, do the same to China, avoid an even worse collapse than Afghanistan under President Joe Biden, create US jobs while saving taxpayer dollars, and secure President Donald Trump’s legacy as a decisive leader of the free world.

Achieving this will require capitalizing on Trump’s position of strength with three negotiating redlines:

1. US and European weapons: Kyiv’s allies must commit to delivering all weaponry needed to make any future Russian attack on Ukraine tantamount to a suicide mission, not accepting any limitations short of nuclear weapons.
2. European and Russian money: Trump should insist that Europe expand two funding sources Biden failed to tap: spending more European fiscal resources on a majority of Ukrainian military aid allocations, and confiscating all $300 billion of Russia’s sovereign assets and remitting it to Ukraine—which should spend half on American weapons or reconstruction contracts.
3. Credible security guarantees: the way to ensure that, unlike the 17 prior Ukrainian ceasefires since 2014, Russia does not violate this one, is for NATO to uphold it. But with or without NATO membership, credible enforcement requires some 100,000 European troops in Ukraine.

Trump and his team appear to be considering Ukraine with commendable flexibility

A good deal will require some time, for two reasons.

First is that delays in US assistance undermine Kyiv’s leverage. A six-month delay in enacting US Congressional assistance let Russia regain battlefield initiative. Not wanting to return to the White House with Kyiv verging on collapse, then-candidate Trump backed the supplemental and it passed. Meanwhile, Biden spent three years slow-rolling decisions to let Ukraine use advanced weapons. Afraid that Russia might escalate, Biden frequently relented only after six months of Kyiv’s begging as consequences mounted on the ground.

Second is Putin. He will call this deal a non-starter. He projects confidence that his gains amid US delays give him the upper hand. And he will test Trump’s resolve in the hope that his campaign pledge to end the war in one day will make Trump accept speed over substance.

The good news is that the Trump administration is showing initial signs that it will not fall into Putin’s trap. Earlier this month, Trump dropped his one-day promise and his nominee for special envoy to Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, said his own goal was to propose a solution within 100 days.

Previewing Trump’s Ukraine strategy during the election, Kellogg recommended an end to restrictions on aid, recognition of Kyiv’s claims to sovereignty over all Ukraine, and “reliable security guarantees, including possible NATO and EU membership, to deter Russia from resuming the conflict”.

In recent private talks with Trump and his team, Europeans have grown optimistic that Trump will be flexible, will not force Kyiv into premature negotiations, and may help Ukraine rebuild its leverage before talks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has also grown flexible, conceding openness to leaving parts of Ukraine occupied by Russia if NATO protects the rest.

Putin looks to exploit hasty negotiations to buy time to rearm and reattack, hoping to topple Kyiv on Trump’s watch

Putin remains uncompromising, demanding that Ukraine never join NATO and that limitations be placed on the size of its army. The Kremlin pretends these constraints are defensive, rendering Ukraine a harmless “neutral state”.

But Putin does not want Ukraine to be neutral. He wants to conquer Kyiv or at least subjugate it under Moscow’s imperial thumb. His strategic goal is to colonize Ukraine by replacing its democratically elected government with a Kremlin puppet regime, rebuilding the old Russian empire.

The fall of Kyiv would prove more humiliating for Washington than the chaotic collapse of Afghanistan—the worst stain on Biden’s foreign policy record. Unlike Afghanistan, Ukraine is as strategically pivotal to great power politics as the Berlin Wall was during the Cold War—the front where East meets West. The US national security strategy issued during Trump’s first term said the central challenge is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by two revisionist powers: Russia and China.

If Russia colonizes Ukraine, China would do the same to Taiwan, and neither revanchist crusade would stop there. Brinkmanship would proliferate as nuclear powers including North Korea learn that aggression goes unchecked. Any US president who allows that strategic catastrophe would go down in history as abdicating his mantle as leader of the free world, reducing the United States to a mere regional power atop one of several chaotic spheres of influence.

To work toward that goal, Putin has one negotiating objective: buy time for Russia to rearm and reattack. That is why he wants to block Ukraine from NATO and limit its defensive capabilities: to make it easy prey.

This time, Putin would not repeat his 2017–2020 mistake of missing the opportunity to invade when Trump is still in office and the Western alliance is divided. China likewise would not miss the opportunity to take Taiwan.

Trump can avoid that historic embarrassment by working with Europe to deter Russia with weapons, money, and security guarantees.

Trump may be the only allied leader in a position to all but assure Ukrainian victory

Because his supporters will take their cue from Trump, he alone can build the sustainable public support across the US political spectrum needed to win a major war.

Russia cannot compete with the scale of Western economies. Russia dedicates 10 percent of its GDP to its war effort, whereas the West is helping Ukraine fight to a draw by spending less than 0.2 percent of its GDP.

With Trump seen as coming from an opposing political perspective, his unexpected turn towards standing up to Russia in Ukraine could be applauded as no less historic than Nixon’s trip to China.

Policy Recommendations

The Trump administration should:

• approach Putin from a position of strength. Whereas Putin looked tough and capable at the outset of Trump’s first term, his blunder in Ukraine has left him diminished. A war meant to last three weeks has lasted three years, causing over 700,000 Russian casualties and laying bare Russia’s military incompetence as it limps along with Iranian drones and North Korean soldiers. Russia recently failed to prop up its client regime in Syria and is spiraling towards becoming a vassal of China. And Putin pushed Sweden and Finland into NATO. By contrast, Trump commands the world’s most powerful military, presides over the fastest-growing G7 economy, has advanced allies dedicated to Ukraine, and just pulled off a historic political comeback. As the dominant partner in this relationship, Trump, not Putin, can set negotiating terms.
• Know when to walk away. A critical moment in the negotiations will come when Putin refuses to make major concessions. Trump must be prepared to walk away, as he rightfully did in negotiations with North Korea when Kim Jong Un was unwilling to denuclearize.
• Combine sanctions with lower oil and gas prices. The best way to make Putin to see that pressing on in Ukraine would spell disaster for his rule is to pressure Russia financially. In its final days, the Biden administration ratcheted up oil sanctions on Russia, a solid move that came three years too late. On his second day in office, Trump threatened Russia with higher taxes, tariffs, and sanctions if Putin refuses to make a deal. But those policy sticks are not enough. Harnessing his warmer relationship with Saudi Arabia than Biden enjoyed, Trump should flood the fossil fuel market, which would make the sanctions sustainable, starve Russia’s war machine, and generate political stability risks in Moscow. 
• Arm Ukraine to the hilt—and create American jobs. The Trump-Kellogg approach of lifting weapons restrictions and sustaining US military aid to lure Ukraine to the negotiating table calls for another supplemental, given that the Biden administration spent down all but $4 billion. This is also key to turning around the battlefield initiative before striking a deal. Almost 90% of this money would stay in the United States, funding the paychecks of factory workers who voted for Trump in states that he won: at General Dynamics’ artillery shell facilities in Pennsylvania and Texas, Northrop Grumman’s gun truck production line in Arizona, Raytheon’s missile factory in Alabama, Lockheed Martin’s F-16 plant in South Carolina, and others.
• Confiscate Russian assets—and reduce the taxpayer burden. The easiest way to augment US-funded Ukraine aid—and show China that attacking Taiwan would be costly—is to give Kyiv all $300 billion of Russia’s frozen assets. The Trump administration should lead by example by implementing the REPO Act more boldly than Biden did, remitting to Kyiv the $5 billion to $19 billion of US-domiciled Russian assets. Then it should press Europe to follow suit, given that most of the money is held there. Trump’s designated treasury secretary has already endorsed this. The $300 billion should be warehoused in a well-governed Ukrainian development bank founded for this purpose. Trump could insist that Ukraine spend half the money on contracts with US companies.
• Make Europe pay more for weapons and keep the peace. Although Europe has committed more than twice as much support to Ukraine since 2022 as the United States has, the US share is slightly larger when looking only at allocated military assistance: $62 billion/50.5%, compared to $61 billion/49.5% from Europe. Although that is razor-close to 50/50, it allows Trump to insist that Europe allocate a majority of military assistance. Europe should also provide 100,000 troops—including divisions from the continent’s two nuclear powers, the United Kingdom and France—to keep the peace, while the United States could provide enabling systems such as missile defense and air power.
• Enable American companies to rebuild Ukraine. Postwar Ukraine will be the world’s greatest investment opportunity, like Western Europe after World War II and Eastern Europe after the Cold War. To ensure the US private sector benefits, a good deal would stipulate that companies hired in a Marshall Plan for Ukraine hail from nations that dedicated the most public resources since 2022—meaning the United States and Europe, but not China.
• Make history with NATO. When the original Marshall Plan got underway in 1948, Soviet encroachment showed that postwar investments must be secured. So, in 1949, NATO was founded. Wealth does not last without security, which is why Kellogg referred to the EU and NATO jointly. The unparalleled credibility of NATO’s security guarantee means it costs less than alternatives, because no adversary dares attack NATO. Negotiations need not start with admitting Ukraine into NATO, which would be a non-starter for Putin. But the Trump administration should prepare for when Putin refuses to accept reasonable terms, at which point Ukraine should be invited to join NATO, with the occupied territories considered parts of Ukraine not currently protected by NATO. This would protect Trump’s deal from unraveling like past agreements with weak security guarantees. That ignoble diplomatic history extends from Neville Chamberlain’s Munich Agreement to both deals in post-Soviet Ukraine: Bill Clinton’s Budapest Memorandum and Barack Obama’s Minsk agreements. With Ukrainian entry into NATO, Trump could legitimately claim he made NATO strong by enlarging it to include Europe’s biggest army. This could come with timeless imagery of an American president changing history on NATO’s eastern frontier unseen since Ronald Reagan’s speech at the Berlin Wall. It would eclipse Biden’s accomplishment of bringing Sweden and Finland into NATO. And it would provide a more durable legacy than foreign policies not enshrined into Senate-ratified treaties, like Obama’s Iran nuclear deal, Paris climate agreement, Trans-Pacific Partnership, and opening to Cuba. Bringing Ukraine into NATO will lock in Trump’s place in the pantheon of American foreign policy.

Josh Rudolph is a senior fellow and the head of GMF’s Ukraine Reform Working Group. He previously worked on Russia and Ukraine policy at the National Security Council in the first Trump administration.

The author is grateful to Cody Fritz, Orysia Lutsevych, and Olena Prokopenko for providing expert feedback on a draft of this memo.