Transatlantic Impacts of President Trump’s Middle East Policy

Speaking with European policy leaders this past week, I found them focused on preparing for differences with the incoming Trump administration on Ukraine and trade issues, but not focused on looming Middle Eastern divergences. Yet, when examining the future of transatlantic relations, it is important to note that the next Trump administration has the potential to upend decades of conventional policy in the Middle East. The most dramatic change would be the United States’ abandonment or significant alteration of its long-held commitment to the two-state solution, a policy begun but not completed during the first Trump administration. This would come as a serious shock to the EU and its member states, which have traditionally positioned themselves alongside the United States as equal defenders of the two-state solution outlined in the Oslo Accords. Several European nations have even moved further with their recognition of Palestine. Finding common positions on how to deal with Iran is not a new challenge, but it will also feature prominently in upcoming transatlantic debates on how to deal with the Middle East. 

It is highly likely that the new administration will adopt a significantly harder stance toward Iran and its proxies, reject the traditional rhetoric and formulas about a two-state solution, and attempt to leverage Trump’s close relations with the Gulf and Saudi Arabia to achieve an expansion of the Abraham Accords deals. These shifts could, in the best-case scenario, create an environment in which a fresh and honest look at the underlying causes of the region’s instability is possible. The tragedies of October 7 and the resulting war in Gaza and Lebanon demonstrate that the Iranian threat and the question of the Palestinians’ political future remain the central causes of the region’s instability. The decades-long Israeli tactic of “managing” the Iranian proxy conflict with periodic “mowing the grass” strikes in Gaza or southern Lebanon has proven a failure. On the Palestinian question, the Israeli government has made it clear that it is opposed to the two-state solution. Even the most cursory glance at the region’s history leaves little room for optimism for the success of these old strategies in establishing security or stability. President-elect Trump will have to decide how best to restore stability and American influence in the region, first by quickly ending the current conflict as he had promised during his campaign. If this succeeds, he will then have the opportunity to propose solutions. 

Any solution will require strategies that address Iranian threats and provide a way forward for Israelis and Palestinians to peacefully coexist. On Iran, the threat of sanctions and possible US military action could potentially lead the new Iranian leadership to take steps to retrench, thus allowing the cessation of the conflict and relief for the civilians in Gaza and Lebanon. Reports of a possible ceasefire in Lebanon give some credence to this result, but the war in Gaza still has no end in sight. Even if Lebanon and Gaza ceasefires are achieved, the Trump administration will need to address the Palestinians’ future if it wishes to achieve the desired outcome of an Israel integrated fully and peacefully into the Middle East. On this issue, the Trump administration will need to either encourage all parties to seriously address the underlying issues that have prevented a two-state solution, or offer a new approach to the Palestinian question. Given the prior positions of the cabinet officials already announced, the latter appears to be the most likely result of the Trump victory. Various versions of this one-state or alternative two-state vision already exist, with former Ambassador David Friedman expressing his ideas in a recent book and the prior Trump administration’s “Deal of the Century” laying out another version of what a new model could look like. Whatever plan the new administration adopts, ending the Gaza conflict quickly is a necessary but not sufficient precondition to convince the Palestinians and the Arab world that this administration’s ideas represent a possible avenue toward a more hopeful future. Of course, a lasting and sustainable resolution of the Palestinian issue will require acceptance from both the Israeli and Palestinian people. In today’s climate this is unlikely unless the plan provides the potential of a future in which both Palestinians and Israelis enjoy the stability and security they deserve.

Regardless of what he decides is the best way forward, President-elect Trump will need to exert effective influence over Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu to end the war and then embrace the Trump administration’s plans for the region. Netanyahu remains a crucial actor in determining the timing of the war’s eventual end and the success or failure of any peace plan. How Netanyahu’s goals align with President-elect Trump’s eventual proposals on Iran and the Palestinians will be fascinating to watch. One key difference from the first Trump term is that October 7 and the Gaza war have shifted the relative importance of the Palestinians in the region; Saudi Arabia has stated that a solution to the Palestinian issue is a precondition to any normalization with Israel. To successfully address the root causes of continued instability in the Middle East, President Trump will also need to find a way to convince the Palestinian people, who supported him in surprising numbers, that his vision includes a hopeful future for them as well as for Israelis. In this aspect there is perhaps room for transatlantic cooperation, if European leaders can work closely with Palestinians to be flexible in thinking, willing to challenge existing two-state orthodoxies, and engage with newly appointed US policy leaders to jointly develop creative solutions.