Safeguarding Hungary’s 2026 Elections: Robust Observation Is Essential

The term “watershed elections” is becoming devalued as electoral contests across the West have increasingly been plebiscites on illiberal populism versus liberal democracy. But it is no exaggeration to say that, in the spring of 2026, Hungary will face its most consequential elections since the first free ones in its post-communist history in 1990.

Since 2014, every parliamentary poll has offered a slight chance to correct Hungary’s increasingly anti-democratic direction, and yet ultimately pushed it further along the autocratization path paved by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party. But the next elections will determine the country’s democratic or authoritarian trajectory—and its geopolitical anchoring will also be at stake. 

Since 2014, Hungary under Orbán’s regime has become increasingly detached from the strategic direction of the other EU member states. This has gone hand in hand with a realignment toward the main challengers of the EU and of the European security order, as has become undeniably evident since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Today, Orbán’s authoritarian ambitions and his geopolitical realignment away from the EU have been emboldened by the recent moves of the second Trump administration that have cast doubts on the United States’ commitment to supporting democracies and maintaining the European security order, weakened Ukraine’s position, and encouraged further disruptions by the Kremlin.

Neither Free, Nor Fair

Against this background, the stakes in Hungary’s next elections will be higher than they have been since 1990, not only for the country’s citizens but also for Europeans at large. Following them, the EU will face a Hungary that is further radicalized in its role as a disruptor or that embarks on re-democratization and reintegration into the mainstream.

Hungary’s citizens have the right to decide the direction of their country and to make this pivotal choice in free and fair elections, as EU membership also stipulates. However, the political and electoral reality is far from that ideal, the country having last had free and fair elections in 2010.

Hungarians have been denied the opportunity to cast their ballots in fair elections for that long due to the regime’s overwhelming media dominance and Fidesz’s comprehensive abuse of state resources, which creates a fundamentally uneven playing field for political competition. This has been well catalogued in the election-monitoring reports of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE-ODIHR) in 2014, 2018, and 2022.

However, in 2026, not only the fairness but also the freedom of the elections is likely to come under significant threat. 

In 2026, not only the fairness but also the freedom of the elections is likely to come under significant threat.

Recently, Hungarian politics has been defined by a mix of promise and danger. For the first time since 2010, a domestic political force, the Respect and Freedom (Tisza) party, poses an existential challenge to Fidesz’s rule. Leading in most independent polls and campaigning on a platform of accountability and anti-corruption, Tisza is gaining momentum. At the same time, there is a growing perception among Fidesz stakeholders that the regime’s usual campaign toolkit may not be sufficient to secure victory this time.

Under these conditions, and encouraged by developments in and ideological support from Washington, Orbán may be tempted to go one step further. Until now, Fidesz’s tactics long before voters went to cast their ballots were the decisive factor in its electoral victories. In 2026, however, in addition to cracking down on independent media and civil society, Orbán could manufacture widespread election-day irregularities to tilt the outcome in his favor.

Robust Election Observation Needed

Hungary has experienced significant election-day irregularities before, particularly in 2018. These saw the organized transportation of voters, fraudulent voter registration in border regions, voter intimidation (especially of public-sector employees and beneficiaries of social security), and vote buying in rural areas and minority communities.

Election watchdogs such as Unhack Democracy found a clear correlation between the proportion of invalid votes and the presence or absence of opposition ballot counters at polling stations. They calculated that, while election-day irregularities were not decisive in securing Fidesz’s governing majority, they may have played a crucial role in it obtaining a two-thirds constitutional supermajority.

In 2022, the deployment of nearly 20,000 independent civic ballot counters and a full OSCE-ODIHR election-observation mission successfully safeguarded the integrity of the ballot on election day. However, the recently adopted and controversial Sovereignty Protection Law may hinder the deployment of a similarly strong domestic effort in 2026. And opposition from the United States and indecision among EU member states could also jeopardize the possibility of a full OSCE-ODIHR mission

Therefore, election-day irregularities could determine the outcome of next year’s contest, potentially leading to a rigged result in an EU country just as in Georgia in 2024, and which would likely be swiftly recognized by the Trump administration.

To prevent this disastrous development for Hungary’s prospects of re-democratization and the democratic integrity of the EU, including the functionality of its decision-making processes, member states need to make sure that there is robust election observation in the country.

This must above all mean a full OSCE-ODIHR mission. While deploying one in an EU country is politically sensitive as it signals the existence of significant irregularities, the parliamentary elections in Bulgaria in 2021 and in Hungary in 2022, as well as in this year’s presidential election in Romania, are precedents. In 2022, the United States championed within the OSCE sending a full mission to Hungary, but it is not likely to do this time. Therefore, EU member states must take the lead and push for the mission’s approval, even in the face of potential US opposition. 

OSCE-ODIHR is expected to decide on the nature of its election observation mission to Hungary around September, following a needs-assessment mission. Until then, EU member states have the opportunity to push for a full mission and to signal their willingness to support it financially and with human resources. In addition, robust observation must include a sizeable European Parliament mission as well as ones from individual member states.

This monitoring would have two aims: deterrence and documentation. The 2022 elections demonstrated that a large-scale effort can deter incumbents from deploying election-day irregularities, and that electoral integrity can improve in a country despite years of democratic backsliding. Solid documentation of any irregularities will also be crucial for the legitimacy of the next government, regardless of whether Fidesz or Tisza emerges as the winner.

Finally, the Sovereignty Protection Law should be suspended to enable the recruitment and training of a sizeable independent domestic ballot-counting force. This could and should be achieved almost immediately through an interim ruling issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union, at the request of the European Commission in its ongoing infringement procedure against the law.

It is of utmost importance that EU member states prepare themselves to address the risk of election-day irregularities in Hungary next year. A robust international observation effort and the suspension of the Sovereignty Protection Law would be crucial steps to protect the country’s democratic future and the integrity of the EU.

Daniel Hegedüs is regional director for Central Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States