Russia’s Recent Emigrants: Mobility and Engagement
Summary
The large number of pro-democracy individuals among Russians who have left Russia since 2022 raises the question of whether they can contribute from the outside to eventual political change in the country. For democracy donors to explore how to foster this potential, though, they need a great deal more information about them than is so far available. This brief presents initial data from a survey of these emigrants and highlights findings relevant to supporting these emigrants as current or potential actors working toward democratic development in Russia.
The survey confirms the potential human capital of the post-2022 emigrants, who are younger and better educated than the average Russian citizen. The majority work in sectors that are based on skills that are also important for and transferable to civic and political activity: information technology, science and education, arts and culture, media and journalism, and public relations and marketing. The earlier narrative of relocated employment for Russian companies is no longer applicable. The economic situation of these emigrants is often precarious, which makes their integrating in host countries more challenging and limits their capacity for civic engagement.
The majority of respondents are in EU countries and to a lesser extent in South Caucasus ones. Their residence situation tends to be uncertain, with a sizeable minority living without permanent status in their host country, including by doing visa runs. The latter are particularly in countries of Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Western Balkans. The process of concentration of the recent emigrants in EU countries is far from played out. Almost half of respondents say they would like to move from their current host country, with EU countries clearly preferred as a destination. Due to the changing political circumstances in the countries around Russia (such as Georgia), migration flows between countries that grant visa-free entry to Russians are volatile.
The main factors respondents say decided them to leave Russia were a mix of the political and war situations. A minority also cited the economic situation. A clear majority say they would consider returning to live in the country, for a mix of reasons but mostly if the political situation there changes. However, most have a high or very high expectation that things in Russia will get worse in the next five years.
A strong majority say that they participate in civil projects and activities: in protests, in providing information support, financial support, and expertise, and in organizing events. But the picture is mixed with regard to respondents’ integration in their host country: only a minority describe themselves as fully integrated.
There remains a considerable lack of knowledge about the details of current pro-democracy actors and activities in the recent Russian emigration, and even more about any further latent democratic potential that could be tapped within it. Donors and assistance implementers are still trying to understand the democratic potential of this community, yet they cannot wait until they do so fully to support actors in it. There is evidence that this emigration is one potential avenue for pursuing the goal of encouraging and assisting Russian actors trying to roll back the country’s autocracy; the greater the knowledge democracy donors gain about this community, the better they will be able to assess how best to use this opportunity.