Russia’s Indo-Pacific Pivot: Patchy, Persistent, and Problematic
With the horrors of Moscow’s 2022 full scale invasion of Ukraine dominating Western policies toward Russia, it is easy to forget that, at the 2012 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vladivostok, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that his country would “turn to the East”.
Moscow’s desire to stake its claim as a third power in the Indo-Pacific reflected the region’s growing strategic and economic importance as well as Moscow’s unease in that it was being overshadowed as Beijing and Washington jostled for influence there. The Kremlin also likely saw an opportunity to gain traction with nonaligned countries in the region seeking alternative strategic partners.
Russia’s pivot faltered from the start. It became increasingly impeded by domestic limitations and the repercussions of its fixation on Ukraine. But Moscow has not given up on the concept and continues to probe for opportunities, especially in defense cooperation. It cannot offer the region much of substance, but it can provoke periodic disruptions.
April Surprise
One such example may have been brewing in recent weeks on the back of Russian Security Council Secretary (and former Defence Minister) Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Indonesia in February.
In an April 14 article, British defense journal Janes reported that Moscow had made an official request to Jakarta to base long-range Russian aerospace forces aircraft at Indonesia’s Manuhua Air Force Base on Biak Island in Irian Jaya. The reporting seemed credible since the publication claimed to have documentation and confirmation from Indonesian government sources that such a request had been received during Shoigu’s trip.
In the aftermath of the Janes report, Indonesian officials quickly ruled out the proposition but left open questions about what had transpired. The Russian response has been even less categorical. Kremlin spokesperson Dimitry Peskov declined to comment, noting, obliquely, that "there are a lot of different pieces of fake news around.” Russia’s ambassador to Indonesia, Sergei Tolchenov, neither confirmed nor denied that an overture had been made but did acknowledge that "interaction between the armed forces of Russia and Indonesia encompasses various areas, including cooperation between the air forces. … Such cooperation is aimed at strengthening the defensive capabilities of both sides, is not aimed against any third countries, and poses no threat to security in the Asia-Pacific region."
Australian Alarm
The Janes report generated an especially anxious response in Australia, currently in the midst of a national election campaign in which international issues have been unusually prominent. Canberra’s fears were allayed, at least for now, by Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin’s assurance to his Australian counterpart that the report was not true.
Australia, a US treaty ally, is highly alert to intensifying Chinese and Russian military activity in its neighborhood. Australia hosts a rotational deployment of US marines in Darwin, 1200 kilometers from the Manuhua base, and US-Australian joint defense facilities. Canberra has also upgraded several airbases in the northern part of the country to enable more frequent US deployments. Australia is also part of the AUKUS defense partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom that will see expanding cooperation on nuclear submarines and other areas of defense. Each of these arrangements attracts interest from Washington’s adversaries.
A Marriage of Mixed Convenience
Russia has maintained a long-standing, if uneven, defense relationship with Indonesia. Moscow has traditionally focused on defense equipment sales, but it has also sought to deepen strategic connections over the past decade. For its part, Indonesia has looked to Russia to diversify its defense procurement and acquire higher-end capabilities more cheaply than those US and European options offer. But Jakarta has been cautious about getting too close to the Kremlin fearing Russian requests, the denting of its nonaligned leadership credentials, and alienating Washington.
Indonesia’s aborted acquisition of Russian Su-35 multirole fighters illustrates the complexity of the relationship. Jakarta announced in 2018 that it would purchase 11 Su-35s. But it immediately encountered strong US opposition, which included the potential for sanctions under the CAATSA Act. COVID-related budget tightening further dented the viability of the acquisition, and it seemed to be dead when Indonesia announced in 2021 that it would procure US and French aircraft instead. Even so, Russia, at least publicly, still believes it can resuscitate the arrangement. Tolchenov noted in January that he did not regard the deal as cancelled and hoped eventually to resume negotiations.
Russia has previously demonstrated its interest in using Indonesia as a staging point for long-range aircraft. In December 2017, Russia flew two Tu-95 strategic bombers and two support aircraft to Biak Island, likely seeking to prove its long-range power projection capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. The bombers then flew a mission over the Torres Strait between Australia and Papua New Guinea, drawing consternation and pushback from Indonesia’s neighbors and the United States. Until the developments claimed in the Janes report, there seemed little prospect of a repeat.
Potentially more durable cooperation, however, seems to be underway in the form of an Indonesia-Russian spaceport joint venture, also likely on Biak Island (an ideal location given its proximity to the equator and existing facilities). Indonesia’s National Agency for Research and Innovation, BRIN, and resources firm PT URPI are to lead development of the facility in collaboration with Glavkosmos, a subsidiary of the Russian state space corporation Roscosmos.
Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov highlighted the project during his visit to Indonesia in October 2024 and noted that Roscosmos was also looking to work with Indonesia on a satellite constellation. Although these ventures are ostensibly civilian and commercial in nature, the distinction with Moscow’s political/security apparatus is blurred in Putin’s Russia. Such cooperation will be a cause for concern in the region if it proceeds.
New President, New Opportunities?
Russia clearly hopes new Indonesian president, Prabowo Subianto, a former (US-trained) general and defense minister, will be receptive to Moscow’s overtures. The Kremlin stepped up senior-level engagement in recent months with the Shoigu and Manturov visits, and undertook its first joint naval exercise with Indonesia in November.
For his part, Prabowo does appear, at this early stage in his term, to be sympathetic to broader cooperation with Moscow (and Beijing) as part of his more “active” approach to nonalignment, without overturning Indonesia’s long-standing geopolitical hedging strategy. During his visit to Moscow as president-elect in August 2024, Prabowo advocated stronger cooperation on defense, energy, and education. Indonesia also continues to maintain a carefully calibrated position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has become a full member of the Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRICs) grouping. Frozen out of many international relationships over its Ukraine atrocities, Moscow will be delighted at Jakarta’s willingness to engage substantively.
The United States remains Indonesia’s most significant security partner, but some in the latter’s military still bristle at past American sanctions on their special forces on human rights grounds. Washington’s current tariff broadsides also will not endear it to Jakarta. And, while Indonesia is still likely to resist China’s coercion in the South China Sea (notwithstanding Prabowo’s early efforts to reset his relations with Beijing with several concessions), it does not want the United States and its partners to be too confrontational.
Ambassador Tolchenov sought to play up this latter dimension when he engaged with Russian media following the air base developments. He criticized partnerships such as AUKUS and the Quad as threats to regional security and asserted that Indonesia accepted these arguments. Drawing a long bow, Tolchenov also drew NATO into the mix, arguing that "of course, there are countries in this region that are ready to do everything that NATO or the Americans tell them, but most of the ASEAN member countries, including Indonesia, are pursuing an independent policy, they absolutely do not like this NATO line, it does not suit them."
While NATO officials might be surprised by this characterization, the upshot of the Janes episode, whether there was much to it or not, is that there is no room for complacency about potential Russian adventurism in the Indo-Pacific, or about the ongoing need for credible security partnership options for nonaligned nations in the region.