“Russia will continue to destabilize Europe. European leaders must invest in defense”

This text was originally published in NRC on July 21, 2024. The interview was conducted by Caroline de Gruyter, a reporter for NRC in Brussels.

After the French elections, Paris' influence in Europe is diminishing and Britain's is increasing, says Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer. “Germany is building new coalitions within the EU to circumvent France.”

“A majority of French voters have supported extreme parties, which are skeptical about relations with the United States and NATO, and aid to Ukraine." Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, senior vice president for geostrategy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the transatlantic think tank, is not optimistic. While she explains why from her office in the Parisian neighborhood of Saint-Germain-des-Prés, a thunderstorm breaks out—as if to underscore the seriousness of the situation.

"The French influence in Europe is decreasing after the French elections," says de Hoop Scheffer. "Given the rules of the French electoral system, the National Rally (RN) did not win the elections, but the party did receive the most votes. President [Emmanuel] Macron remains responsible for foreign policy and defense, whatever government France gets. But he will have to take this result into account. Moreover, the financial situation in France is worrying. All these factors will curb France’s influence in Europe. The French president, who has been very outspoken about Ukraine and has made ambitious proposals for European reforms and European policy, is now in a tight spot.”

Who, do you think, will jump in to fill the gap?

I think we are going to see a stronger United Kingdom. The new British government is deliberately strengthening its relationship with the EU. Starting with Germany. The new foreign secretary, David Lammy, traveled to Berlin immediately, on his first day in office. This did not go unnoticed by the French leadership. They are deeply unhappy about it. As France's voice weakens on the international stage, it creates room for other alliances.

Will there also be a new kind of Weimar group emerging, made of large European countries, for informal foreign affairs consultations? 

Weimar has so far consisted of France, Germany, and Poland, the three largest EU countries. This will now, I think, become “Weimar-plus” by adding London to the list. Macron will have to focus on domestic politics. Chancellor [Olaf] Scholz is seizing that opportunity to dilute the French influence by bringing in the British. He has also deepened Germany’s strategic alliance with Italy. In the financial-economic sector, for example, he is again seeking support of [frugal countries], including the Netherlands, to prevent issuing Eurobonds for defense, which France advocates. In other words, Germany is using two strategies at once: It builds new coalitions within the EU to circumvent France, and, for bigger issues such as foreign policy, it engages with the British.

These countries are happy about this.

Yes, of course. They reacted immediately.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Germany has also been pulling toward the United States, right?

Yes. That also causes tensions between Germany and France. Because of the war in Ukraine, Germany feels vulnerable since its armed forces are in very bad shape. It turns to the United States for protection. For the French, who want to strengthen European defense capabilities, this undermines the idea of a stronger European defense. Together, the United States and Germany are now blocking Ukraine's NATO membership. But France, the United Kingdom, Poland, and many Central and Eastern European countries are in favor. In this case, you can notice that the British sometimes go along with the French.

London is now supporting a European defense, which it was previously adamantly against.

London sees America's strategic focus on China and draws its own conclusion: This is a trend that will continue no matter who wins the election in November. During last week’s NATO summit in Washington, DC, Americans invited four Asian countries as guests. Washington managed to get statements on China in the final declaration of that summit despite reluctance from France and other European allies, which want to keep NATO focused on the Euroatlantic area. The Americans still mostly look at Europe through a Chinese prism.

In what respect?

Look at ASML! The United States says it will act as a responsible ally as long as the Europeans buy American weapons and support the American technology agenda. Technology is crucial to the Americans. They believe that whoever gains the technological upper hand in the 21st century will be the future’s superpower. European technology companies’ economic ties with China are, therefore, in deep geopolitical trouble. They say they are “just” doing business with China and that this is apolitical, but that is not how Americans see it. In their eyes, European governments that allow their companies to supply advanced technology to China are undermining vital American interests. This technology conversation will increasingly shape the future of transatlantic relations.

Can Washington even say, “If you continue to supply technology to China, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty—[which states that] an armed attack on one NATO country is an attack on all of them—is a dead letter for us”?

The Americans are putting enormous pressure on European governments, so I would not rule out this kind of blackmail. I advise large companies on the geopolitical risks impacting them and help them design strategies to mitigate these risks, and [I] often tell them, “Like it or not, your company just ends up in the geopolitical basket.”

Are those technology companies?

Yes, but big ports, energy and defense companies, and electric car manufacturers are also in the eye of the geopolitical storm.

How does this affect the war in Ukraine?

From the beginning, the war was part of a bigger story. Now, you see the link between China and Russia getting stronger and stronger. This affects the transatlantic conversation. The United States says to the Europeans, “You are fueling the war by continuing to trade with China! So your security depends on how far you decouple from China.” For Washington, trade and security are interlinked. And this is what [US President Joe] Biden says. Imagine what [Donald] Trump says when he becomes president.

Rough weather for transatlantic relations then?

The war in Ukraine is accelerating the development of new political alliances. Transatlantic relations are becoming an alliance amid many others. President Macron embraces President Lula. Chancellor Scholz actively engages with the Global South. Africa and the Middle East are becoming geopolitical chessboards in the broader power competition. Ukraine is just one piece of this complicated puzzle. If we Europeans want to remain relevant, we must look critically at our diplomacy.

How so?

In 2009-2011, I worked at the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, including on the nuclear deal with Iran. One day a Brazilian-Turkish proposal came up. The West's reaction was: “What the hell, why are they interfering?” That is no longer possible. You cannot ignore them anymore. India, Türkiye, Africa—they suffer the most from the war in Ukraine, notably due to food supply issues, and, at the same time, they circumvent the sanctions against Russia the most. They buy oil, sell raw materials to Russia. They allow President [Vladimir] Putin to have his way in Ukraine, against the West. Without them, a ceasefire in Ukraine is unthinkable. They will have a place at the table.

Don't they already have that? Türkiye has organized negotiations.

Yes. But Western countries find it difficult to accept that.

Can Trump “stop the war within 24 hours” if he becomes president?

He will certainly try to do that. He will go to both Russia and China, and say, “I'll give Russia something on the condition that China takes it down a notch [with Russia].”

Is that in China's interest?

That depends on the offer.

And then what do the Europeans do?

Exactly, that is the question. My guess: They will let it happen. European leaders will be happy to see an end to the war.

While most European citizens support Ukraine.

Yes, that is striking. Citizens realize that this is our war.

Putin himself says that the enemy is not Ukraine but the West, NATO, right?

Yes. When Macron raised the question about a European military presence in Kyiv, he admitted that this was our war. In London and The Hague, they see it no differently. Former [Dutch] Prime Minister [Mark] Rutte supports building a European pillar within NATO. If Trump becomes president, that pillar will be crucial. You cannot hang Europe's security on an unpredictable American leader.

Do the Americans support this?

Yes, if the Europeans pay for it themselves. Then Washington will have its hands free to focus on China. Europe should not make the mistake of focusing solely on Europe. It must realize that China is Washington's number-one priority.

The tricky part lies in the following paradox: Europe urgently needs to develop a stronger, independent arms industry, but the United States prefers that Europe continue to purchase its military equipment from America. Germany does, Poland and some Central European countries also buy massively weapons from the United States. But France wants to build up a European defense industry as soon as possible.

Logical. The existing French industry benefits from that.

That is true. But that does not change the fact that we need a stronger European arms industry.

Another Franco-German dispute.

Yes. Germany is also working on European air defense, which France is not participating in. Unfortunately, the outcome is that Europe is unable to build a robust defense industry of its own and is increasingly dependent on America. For our green transition, we are increasingly dependent on China’s critical minerals. So, in two critical areas [defense and energy], we are becoming more and more dependent on these two big powers.

Which will make both superpowers pull harder and harder on Europe.

Yes, and on our companies. Politics and business are becoming more and more intertwined. There is no escape.

Suppose Trump stops the war in Ukraine, will European leaders want to invest in defense at all? It is expensive, and citizens want the money to go to other things.

There might be a ceasefire, but that does not mean the war will be over then. There will be permanent instability. Russia will continue to destabilize Europe. European leaders do need to invest in defense. They simply have no choice, especially if Trump becomes president and starts threatening to withdraw from NATO again.