Protests Leave Serbia’s Politics Finely Balanced

Serbia has witnessed its fair share of anti-government protests over the past decade, fueled by growing dissatisfaction with the corruption and authoritarianism of President Aleksandar Vučić’s regime. Nothing, however, compares to the massive mobilization of citizens since November following the collapse of the railway station in Novi Sad, which claimed 16 lives. This popular swell led to the largest protest in the history of the country on March 15.

The key catalyst for the protest movement were university and high-school students who blocked their educational institutions and demanded justice for the victims. Since then, students have organized peaceful activities to put pressure on the government. Their marches through the country, during which they were emotionally greeted by thousands, have been some of the most striking scenes in recent decades.

While the formal focus of the students’ protests is accountability for the Novi Sad tragedy, their efforts rapidly led to the formation of a social movement against corruption, state capture, and omnipresent violence in society in large part generated by the regime. Other political issues have been marginalized and the movement has so far been ideologically wide and heterogenous. 

The fact that Serbia’s youth became so committed to this goal has mobilized large parts of society to join them in the fight. Meanwhile, everything the regime has deployed to subdue the protests—tactical concessions, endless propaganda, and attempts at intimidation and violence—has failed, or in some cases backfired.

The new social mobilization frequently manifests itself at the local level. Citizens have begun to regularly confront local officials who, due to large-scale election manipulation, almost without exception belong to the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Recent weeks have seen people expressing their anger at the way it governs by jeering and throwing eggs at local party members and, in more extreme cases, chasing them away. 

However, the newly energized revolt against the SNS and the demand for change have not led to a significant increase in support for any opposition party. This is due to the widespread and deeply rooted perception that party politics is a “dirty” enterprise and that the “pure” students and people risk being exploited by “corrupt” opposition politicians. Many see the opposition parties as part of the problem, not of the solution.

This is unfair to a large extent as many opposition members were the targets of the government’s authoritarian moves in recent years.  But the opposition parties have also fueled the low trust in themselves by frequently letting their fragmentation and particular interests get in the way of effective resistance to the SNS.

Some creative solutions have emerged that attempt to tap people’s aversion to party politics and the unprecedentedly high motivation to fight for political change.

Some creative solutions have emerged that attempt to tap people’s aversion to party politics and the unprecedentedly high motivation to fight for political change. At the suggestion of students, citizens have started organizing informal local assemblies that have no connection to parties. These have so far mostly served as platforms for exchanging views, for formulating requests to municipal bodies, and for organizing some local activities. What their long-term influence could be is impossible to ascertain at this point.

The determination of many protesters to keep “regular” politicians at arm’s length will likely blunt the political impact of the protests. Nevertheless, Serbia has a history of fluctuations in the party system with the sudden emergence of organizations and personalities who quickly gain significant support—and then lose it. It is hard to imagine that no one will be able to articulate politically today’s strong appetite for change, especially when the next elections approach. Those most successful in this will likely be actors with a populist and anti-establishment appeal.

The regime will do everything in its power to limit political change. While Vučić and the SNS are currently on the defensive, they still control vast resources and many levers of power, including hooligan groups that act as a para-police. The regime is down but not out, and it will fight to stay in power, and the next elections do have to take place until 2027. When they come, they will hardly be a carnival of democracy, and increased repression against the regime’s critics and opponents is highly probable.

Yet, the SNS members seem demoralized and low on enthusiasm. They have witnessed the president desperately trying but failing to quell the protests for months. The image of Vučić as an all-powerful leader has been damaged, and the regime’s lack of strong ideological foundations, which was once its strength by allowing it to create a broad base of support, is now turning into its weakness as it is running out of inspiring causes its supporters can rally behind. 

Vučić is now turning all his attention to consolidating his base and retaining as many voters as possible. On the other hand, the resistance to his rule is growing and getting energized. The current protests might subside without affecting the political balance of power, but any new mistake by the regime could bring people out on the streets again. And, if that does not happen, the decisive showdown will take place at the next elections, whenever they occur.

Aleksandar Ivković is a ReThink.CEE Fellow 2024 of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.