Pragmatic Fatalism: Ukraine Is Passive in the Face of U.S. Elections
Central and Eastern European Perspectives on the U.S. Election
In September, the office of President Volodymyr Zelensky approved a new national security strategy. It proposes that Ukraine build good neighborly relations with the countries of Central and Southern Europe, and establish a strategic partnership with Poland, Lithuania, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. The most important category of countries—those with which Ukraine aims to develop a “comprehensive partnership”—includes Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and above all the United States.
After the 2014 democratic revolution, U.S.-Ukrainian relations entered a new stage. Since then, Washington has not only made a special effort to support Ukrainian reforms but has also provided financial, military, and technical assistance. This year this aid is estimated to total $500 million.
At the same time, cooperation is highly asymmetrical. The relationship has strategic significance only for Ukraine—the last time a U.S. president visited Ukraine was in 2008, and the amount of U.S. aid to the country is smaller than that given to South Sudan or Ethiopia.
Last year, Ukrainian Prism, a council of foreign policy experts, awarded the grade of B+ to cooperation with the United States, but the restrained optimism in Kyiv has given way to anxiety and wariness on the eve of the U.S. presidential election.
The Wrong Republican
Ukraine traditionally expects a more active foreign policy and a tougher stance on Russia from Republican presidents. However, in 2016 Ukrainian politicians were preparing for Hillary Clinton’s victory, and President Petro Poroshenko’s team was working only with Democrats.
Skepticism about Donald Trump’s candidacy was motivated by his statements about the possibility of reaching an agreement with President Vladimir Putin and by Paul Manafort’s prominent role in his campaign.
Press reports about Manafort's connections with ex-president Viktor Yanukovych eventually cost him his post as Trump’s campaign chairman. At the time, Manafort was actively promoting the idea of “Ukrainian interference” in U.S. elections. Apparently, due to this story, Trump was deeply offended by Ukraine, and as early as 2016 he started to perceive the country not as a challenge, but only as a problem.
Ukrainian elites failed to rectify this situation. In recent years, the United States has maintained and even expanded anti-Russian sanctions. The volume of U.S. financial, military, and technical assistance has grown, but this is the result of bipartisan compromise in Congress and pressure from a community of pro-Ukrainian experts in Washington.
Ahead of the upcoming election, Trump has made no secret of his irritation with Ukraine. The main reason is “Ukrainegate.” Although Ukraine was able to pull off a balancing act, standing up to pressure from Trump and avoiding entanglements with his opponents, President Zelensky has never paid a visit to the White House. For his part, Trump never misses the chance to remind audiences that Ukraine is “a corrupt country full of terrible people.”
While the administration has earned some sympathy in Ukraine for the sale of Javelin missiles to the Ukrainian army, Trump is extremely unpopular there compared to in other Central and Eastern European countries. In late 2019, only 30 percent of Ukrainians said they had a positive perception of him, while 42 percent expressed negative views. Among foreign leaders, only Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russia’s Vladimir Putin fare worse.
It Takes Two to Tango
Current relations can hardly be called complex and revolve mainly around security issues. Ukraine has been unable to move beyond this framework—not only because of Trump, but also because of its own personnel problems.
In Ukraine, it is not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the Presidential Office that is responsible for relations with key external partners. In fact, the country’s foreign policy is set by a dozen people: in Zelensky’s office, this group is led by Andriy Yermak, a former copyright lawyer and film producer with no background in diplomacy.
During Ukrainegate, Yermak represented Zelensky’s interests in the United States. He was assisted by Igor Novikov, a member of the U.S. Singularity University community who handled contacts with the U.S. media. Another one of Yermak’s friends, Andrew Mac, worked with the State Department and Congress. The son of a Ukrainian emigrant, he acts as a Ukrainian lobbyist in Washington.
Pragmatic Fatalism
As a result, the Ukrainian government is not connecting either with Team Trump or Team Biden. Pragmatic fatalism reigns supreme in Kyiv.
A Biden victory would certainly be preferable to Ukraine. He worked with Ukrainian authorities during Barack Obama’s presidency, so Kyiv would not need to establish new relations with his administration. It could merely refresh the old ones.
What distinguishes Biden from Trump is his predictability and commitment to the transatlantic partnership. With Putin in power in Russia, any rift between the United States, France, and Germany is extremely dangerous for Ukraine. However, no one should expect a breakthrough on Ukraine from Biden.
Biden recently published a statement on Ukraine in which he promised to push to end the conflict in Donbas, support reforms, maintain military aid, and back the rule of law. There were no surprises in his statement: he plans to continue the policies of all previous administrations.
However, a possible second term for Trump should not be considered a tragedy for Ukraine. His past attempts in to play “frenemy” and delay military aid were eventually thwarted by the State Department and Congress.
For Trump and Biden alike, Ukraine’s relationship with China will certainly be important. In recent years, China has become one of the country’s top trading partners, and Kyiv has been considering a partnership with Huawei and the possible sale of the strategic engine manufacturer Motor Sich to Chinese investors. These steps have already drawn objections from the United States.
Whether Trump or Biden is in office, the main problem for U.S.-Ukrainian relations lies in the lack of a clear vision of what policy Ukraine wishes to pursue with the United States. Six years after Euromaidan, Ukraine still does not have a coherent strategy for its foreign policy. Its politicians primarily perceive the United States as the source of symbolic victories that can be sold to voters.
This is part of our series on the policy implications of the 2020 U.S. elections for U.S. allies—you’ll find the rest of the series HERE.