Orbán Meddles in Georgia's Politics

The Hungarian prime minister sent congratulations to the anti-Western ruling party before the official release of election results.
October 28, 2024
3 min read
Photo credit: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com

Responding to glaring irregularities in her country’s parliamentary election, Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili labeled the vote a “Russian special operation”. But the “operation” received support from an unusual if familiar source: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, often regarded as the Kremlin’s most reliable ally in the EU and NATO.

In a move aligned with predictions this author made in May, Orbán endorsed ruling party Georgian Dream’s (GD) election victory before even the announcement of the official results. Hungarian government sources soon thereafter confirmed that Orbán would meet GD’s leader, Irakli Kobakhidze, on a two-day visit starting less than 48 hours after the vote.

Given Georgia’s heated political landscape—in which opposition parties have disputed the election results amid widespread accusations of fraud, and Zourabichvili has urged citizens to protest—the Hungarian government’s actions are unmistakably intrusive. The intervention arrives at a critical moment, as Georgia faces a choice that will shape its geopolitical orientation: aligning with the West or succumbing to Russian influence.

Budapest’s actions, transparently serving Russian interests, mirror the provocative and disruptive diplomacy seen in July during the first two weeks of Hungary’s EU Council presidency, when Orbán traveled to Moscow. This latest move is not a standalone event; it is the second act in an ongoing play.

What are the implications of Hungary’s intervention on Russia’s behalf in the Georgian election?

From a Georgian domestic standpoint, Orbán’s endorsement and visit provide critical support and legitimacy to GD. Orbán has not spoken officially in his capacity as EU Council president, but GD will leverage his endorsement to imply that key EU figures recognize the contested election results. His visit thus offers the party a political lifeline, bolstering its position against largely pro-EU protesters united in their commitment to Georgia’s EU aspirations.

From the EU’s perspective, Orbán’s actions signal a strategic alignment with pro-Russian Georgian elites whose political aims threaten to derail Georgia’s path toward integration into the bloc. This intervention starkly illustrates Hungary’s willingness to contravene EU foreign policy consensus, openly violating the principle of loyal cooperation outlined in the Treaty on European Union, which obliges member states to “refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives”.

With his intervention into Georgian politics, Orbán appears to pursue two objectives, He is expanding his own strategic latitude and disrupting EU institutions and foreign policy, objectives he evidently sees as advancing his regime’s interests.

The irony is undeniable. Orbán’s government regularly decries alleged foreign interference in Hungary’s politics, claiming such actions violate the country’s sovereignty. Yet, when it comes to asserting Hungarian influence abroad, particularly when the alliances and strategic interests of their Fidesz party are at stake, Orbán and his government readily intervene in the internal affairs of other nations.

What transpired in Georgia, however, may well be a dress rehearsal for another act soon to follow. It would be unsurprising if, come November 6, Orbán is one of the first to congratulate Donald Trump on a “victory”, even as recounts proceed in contested swing states. That would constitute yet another profound challenge to EU foreign policy.