Nord Stream Redux
A drone attack incinerated the Sudzha pipeline station in the Kursk region of Russia on the night of March 20–21. Ukraine and Russia are blaming each other for now. The ambush escalates tensions after Russian drones bombarded Ukrainian energy infrastructure shortly after Putin agreed in principle to a limited ceasefire suspending such attacks.
The destruction of the Sudzha pipeline station not only undermines the potential for a ceasefire but could also dramatically alter the landscape of European energy security.
The now-critically damaged pipeline represented a key source of leverage in potential Trump-brokered negotiations between Russia and Ukraine: each party has its own interests in restoring gas transit in Ukraine as part of a deal. But the pipeline was also used to sneak Russian troops into Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk on March 8, contributing to the retreat of Ukrainian forces from the area. Its functional destruction thus marks a symbolic—and potentially strategic—turning point.
The station was the only remaining viable transit point through Ukraine for Russian pipeline gas to the EU. Now, resolving the fate of Nord Stream 2—a technically viable but politically toxic alternative, and already a major dossier for the future German government—becomes much more urgent. In a US-backed bid for control over a key pipeline, US investors have reportedly been working on a deal to buy Nord Stream 2, which connects Russia to Germany. For its part, the Trump administration has a complex stake in both securing a broader deal with Russia and expanding the flow of US liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe.
Germany and the EU face a deepening policy dilemma. The future German government is being pressured by industries and members of the conservative Christian Democratic Union to resume purchases of Russian pipeline gas to bring down energy prices and help restore competitiveness. But doing so would prolong Europe’s ongoing financing of Russia’s war effort and sow division with more hawkish European countries. Despite largely replacing Russian pipeline gas with purchases of LNG from the United States since 2022, EU countries still bought €22 billion in Russian fossil fuels in 2024—more than the nearly €19 billion in financial aid they allocated to Ukraine. And ceding de facto control over a critical piece of energy infrastructure is not the only risk involving the United States: Buying more US LNG as an alternative to Russian gas has its own drawbacks, further exposing Europe to fickle markets and policy reversals by the Trump administration.
Given the stakes, the Merz government should resist pressure to certify the reopening of Nord Stream 2. Giving in to the pressure would further entangle European energy security with the United States and Russia, divide European allies, and fill the Kremlin’s coffers. Germany and Europe will have to find other solutions for cheap energy.