With a New U.S. Administration, What Is Next for Macron’s Middle East Ambitions?

The mixed results of France’s policy in the Middle East during the presidency of Emmanuel Macron are the product of a changing geopolitical landscape, of the United States acting as an unreliable and self-centered ally there, and of domestic dynamics. As the region will continue to capture much of Paris’s attention, the start of the Biden administration presents Macron with a real opportunity to reaffirm France’s global relevance.

In line with his predecessors, Macron sees the Middle East as the linchpin of France’s global ambitions. In practice, however, his ability to unilaterally translate his vision into action has been shown to be severely constrained. In Libya, covert and ambiguous support for Khalifa Haftar, a warlord with a mediocre human-rights record, has failed to pay off. Macron’s attempts to mediate the dispute between Iran and the United States have collapsed. In Syria, the unilateral U.S. withdrawal left France astounded and alone. And Macron’s most recent initiative in the region appears bound to suffer a similarly unsatisfactory fate. Despite earning praise for his initiative to prompt political reforms in Lebanon by conditioning France’s humanitarian aid on these in the aftermath of the Beirut explosion last August, the resignation of designated Prime Minister Mustapha Adib in September after failing to form a government confronted Macron with an uncomfortable truth: France alone is unable to overcome the inertia of Lebanese politics.

In the new geopolitical reality in the Middle East, Western voices, including France’s, are increasingly marginalized. Russia, Turkey, and Iran have largely benefited from the United States’ disengagement from the region in recent years. Ankara and Moscow are the real powerholders in Syria and Libya while Tehran’s support of proxies in Iraq and Yemen has proven a low-cost way to influence regional dynamics.

At the same time, the United States’ one-dimensional pro-Israel anti-Iran policy under Trump left France with limited support in its effort to carve itself a role in the region. In Libya, Washington’s inaction reduced Paris’s leverage to curb Turkish ambitions. Most notably, in Lebanon, the French initiative collided with the “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran. Franco-U.S. divergences over the inclusion of Hezbollah in the talks for the formation of a government, a decision criticized by the United States while it imposed new sanctions on politicians allied to the Iran-backed group, has contributed to the current deadlock.

France’s domestic challenges also undermine its ambitions. The vivid issue of laïcité and religious separatism, even more politicized ahead of Macron’s expected electoral contest with far-right candidate Marine Le Pen in the 2022 presidential election and in the face of renewed terrorist attacks, has recently been at the center of the national debate. In turn, repeated calls to boycott French products, following Macron’s controversial statements on Islam and his defense of the Muhammad caricatures, constitute the latest blow to France’s soft power in the region, a tool crucially needed for Paris to position itself as an honest power broker there.

Nevertheless, the Middle East will continue to be a hotspot of Macron’s diplomatic activism, given not only historical connections but also French economic and security interests. France’s defense industries and energy sector eye the region and the fight against terrorism remains high on the agenda. As such, the quest for stability will continue to feed Paris’s pragmatism, aimed at safeguarding its influence whenever possible.

Macron’s greatest opportunities in the region rest with the new administration in Washington. President Joe Biden has committed to fully reassessing the United States’ partnership with Saudi Arabia and indicated he would not write a blank check to Trump’s once favorite autocrat, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. By contrast, Macron confirmed during Sisi’s recent state visit in Paris that France would not condition military aid to human rights in Egypt.

But how resolute the Biden administration will be in turning round U.S. Middle East policy is not yet clear. The few details released following Biden’s announcement that the United States would end its support for Saudi Arabia’s offensive operations in Yemen confirm this uncertainty. At the end of the day, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia all remain vital to Washington’s security architecture. Yet, real U.S. decisiveness in reevaluating defense ties with regional partners would give France a chance to reinforce its realpolitik economic diplomacy—already prolific during the Obama administration—and to step in as the pragmatic military salesman. (This despite a growing domestic outcry from parliamentarians and NGOs demanding greater oversight of foreign military sales.)

Ultimately, Biden’s intent to have the United States reengage more in world affairs constitutes an opportunity for France to reaffirm its geopolitical relevance in the Middle East. Key members of the new administration have extensive Middle East expertise, which suggests that de-prioritization of the region will be unlikely. On the ground, U.S. reengagement will translate into consistent opposition to Russia, a tougher stance against Turkey’s disruptive behavior, and a greater willingness to engage with allies—three developments that will be positive for France.

At the same time, the Biden administration will be confronted with a wide array of other challenges, including domestic polarization and competition with China. With the will and the capacity to act, France will be an international partner of choice for it, especially in a context that increasingly favors transatlantic burden shifting. In this process, its ability to mobilize European countries, made harder right now by the United Kingdom’s post-Brexit uncertainties and Germany’s upcoming elections, will be critical. The E3’s efforts over the last two years to maintain the Iran nuclear deal alive has been a remarkable diplomatic success and one that could be replicated.

With renewed leadership in Washington, Paris can reaffirm its geopolitical relevance in the Middle East. In this endeavor, Macron’s ability to set realistic ambitions and forsake go-it-alone tendencies will be crucial. Iran is a natural issue to restart transatlantic cooperation and Macron has already offered to be “honest broker” in U.S.-Iran talks. A change of tone vis-à-vis Tehran, one that fosters dialogue and pragmatically addresses Iran’s support for regional proxies—including Hezbollah—will also provide Macron’s Lebanon initiative with reinvigorated momentum.

Ultimately, its ability to secure greater regional engagement by its European partners, especially the United Kingdom and Germany, will allow France to become a more credible and capable partner for the United States. In this context, Macron may well be able to finally translate his ambitions into successes.

Thibaut Trinquet is a former research intern at the Paris Office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He is finishing his master’s in international relations at Sciences Po and King’s College London.