The NATO Washington Summit and the Southern Flank

For 75 years, NATO strategy toward its southern flank has generally taken a back seat to more demanding and existential requirements in the East. At a time of war in Ukraine and an increasingly dangerous confrontation with Russia, security challenges emanating from the South—from Africa to the Persian Gulf—will not top the alliance’s summit agenda in Washington, DC. But these challenges are critical to transatlantic security in their own right and as an element in the conflict with Moscow. The summit is an opportunity to build on NATO’s recent report by independent experts to articulate a more explicit strategy for its southern neighborhood. Three factors should be considered.

First, allies need to counter Russia there as part of an overall strengthening of deterrence and defense. The Mediterranean Sea, Africa, and the Persian Gulf may not be the center of gravity in the confrontation with Moscow. Yet these are places where Russian and NATO interests, and often the forces of member states, come into contact. In this regard, Syria, Libya, and the Sahel are potential flashpoints alongside more obvious ones in the Baltic and on the Black Sea. Unlike the situation on the eastern flank, where NATO has had to create new forces and infrastructure, the bloc’s southern flank already has a wealth of assets, including substantial air and naval forces. Warning and planning rather than new investment are the priorities here.

Second, a set of specific missions will have their center of gravity on the southern flank. These are directly relevant to crisis prevention and management, a core NATO task. Missions here include counterterrorism, maritime security, protection of undersea infrastructure, and missile defense. The ongoing conflict in Gaza and Lebanon and the potential for further escalation with Iran underscore the risk. Continued attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Hizbollah’s threat to target energy and other assets in the Eastern Mediterranean touch directly on NATO’s security interests. These are missions for which alliance forces are well suited.

Third, regional partnerships will continue to be essential, but they are not a substitute for a more explicit strategy. Indeed, the lack of a clear southern strategy has inhibited effective cooperation with existing partners in the southern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. NATO may need to develop new institutional ties in Africa as it becomes more important to transatlantic security. The mix of military and non-military challenges also makes the South a promising area for NATO-EU cooperation.

For more on NATO's southern strategy, read "Go South, NATO" by Javier Cantero and "NATO Looks South: Elements of a Strategy" by Ian Lesser.