JD Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference should be seen as a clarification of Donald Trump's vision
This commentary was originally published in French in Le Monde on February 19, 2025.
Donald Trump's presidency is accelerating the pace of change that has been reshaping the US role in the world and reconfiguring alliances for more than two decades. Trump is intensifying the pivot to Asia by transferring (rather than sharing) the burden of European security to the Europeans themselves while he refocuses on three priorities: economic security, China, and immigration.
The United States' European partners failed to take these structural trends seriously. They instead remained complacent. US Vice President JD Vance's speech on February 14 at the Munich Security Conference should be seen as clarifying Trump's vision, leaving Europe facing the urgent need to accelerate strategic changes if it does not want to fade from the global geopolitical stage.
Europeans have no choice but to make Washington an offer to guarantee Ukraine’s security if they want to preserve their strategic interests and transatlantic relations. This should be more than just a transaction; it requires immediate, shared, and sustainable reinvestment in European defense capabilities and close cooperation with the United Kingdom.
By opening negotiations with [Russian President] Vladimir Putin without first consulting Europeans, Trump signalled a significant but predictable turning point in the Ukrainian conflict. Two things are now clear. First, Trump wants a rapid resolution to the conflict despite shifting outlines of an agreement. Second, he is clearly dividing responsibilities. The United States will lead negotiations while Europe will manage implementation by providing aid, security guarantees, and military presence. Europe will also assume the significant financial burden that goes with that.
Moment of Truth
Following Trump's victory in November 2024, it was clear that Ukraine would be the first test of the transatlantic relationship and that the issue would determine how and if Europeans and Americans could work together over the next four years. The moment of truth has arrived, and it concerns more than the Ukrainian crisis. It is part of a broader desire by the United States to fundamentally rethink its commitment to European defense. Regardless of who next occupies the White House, this will continue to be the consensus in Washington.
Trump is also quickly reconfiguring alliances around the world. As Russian-American talks take place in Riyadh, Ukrainian President [Volodymyr] Zelenskyy is visiting the United Arab Emirates, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia. Crisis diplomacy is now taking place outside the West, with a prospective ceasefire potentially involving China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Türkiye, as well as the United States and Russia. Europe has a small window of opportunity to try and stay relevant.
Europeans missed their “Biden moment” that should have allowed them to assert leadership on European security issues. Instead, the war in Ukraine reinforced their dependence on American armaments (F-35 fighter jets, Apache helicopters, Himars systems, M1A1 Abrams tanks, etc.) and energy (liquefied natural gas and crude oil).
Rethinking Defense Architecture
The emergency meeting [among European leaders] in Paris on February 17 did not produce a shared vision. It instead highlighted deep European divisions over the deployment of troops in Ukraine against the backdrop of concerns about US involvement.
With the EU’s lack of unity, the United Kingdom is (for now) facilitating connections with the United States. The French president’s absence from British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s forthcoming trip to Washington at the end of February seems like a missed opportunity at a time when Europe needs Anglo-French leadership to build a European coalition and to shape how security guarantees are implemented.
Rather than seek to maintain US involvement in European security at any price, including by making concessions harmful to their interests, Europeans should proactively reform and Europeanize NATO. They should transform the Atlantic alliance, abandoning the idea of a two-pillar Euro-American model, one that risks collapse when the American pillar falters, for one with more financial and political balance. European NATO members currently spend just 1.9% of GDP on defense. The upcoming NATO summit in The Hague on June 24-26 is expected to raise the spending target to 3% of GDP.
But increasing defense budgets without rethinking Europe’s defense architecture will neither maximize the potential of this colossal investment nor garner public support. The challenge now is to use these resources strategically. EU member states will be unable to avoid issuing joint debt, as they did for their post-COVID recovery plan, and the European Commission will need to relax budgetary rules and the Stability Pact. Germany’s position is gradually evolving on this issue.
Political leaders need to communicate extensively with their citizens about these crucial issues and they investments they require, as is already being done in the United Kingdom, Poland, and Sweden. Europe has everything to gain from increasing its defense industrial production. Investments and research in defense will have a lasting impact on the sovereign digital and energy transitions, and, therefore, on Europe’s long-term resilience.