A German Warning
The recent European Parliament (EP) election represents for Germany a prelude to the next national election, which must be held by October 2025. The gains of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) confirm that it is a party here to stay. Another impressive performance, that of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), founded only six months ago, reinforces the continuing fragmentation of the German political landscape. Both fringe parties are drawing voters away from the traditional, catch-all parties of the center right (the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) and center left (Social Democratic Party (SPD)).
Although the mainstream conservatives are satisfied with garnering 30% of the EP vote and the smaller, liberal Free Democrats (FDP) are relieved to get 5%, Germany’s other mainstream parties are left deflated. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s SPD had its worst-ever performance, trailing even the AfD. The Greens lost nearly half of their voters from the previous EP election in 2019.
A strong Europe is critical for German security and prosperity, but voters used their ballots to show displeasure with conditions at home. A poll by public broadcaster ARD released a day after the election showed 76% of respondents are dissatisfied with their government. The AfD’s and BSW’s strong performances may be considered protest votes, but they mean more obstacles for EU assistance to Ukraine and investment in innovation to maintain the bloc’s competitiveness.
The AfD came in second overall, a noteworthy result also because it follows two recent scandals. The first linked two party candidates to China and Russia. The second arose after the lead candidate said in an interview that not all members of the SS were criminals. That comment even prompted French far-right leader Marine Le Pen to boot the AfD out of the EP’s Identity and Democracy group, but it had little effect on German voters.
The core of German discontent comes from the former East German states, which provided the overwhelming majority of AfD and BSW support. There, parties that pursue a hard line on migration but are soft on Russia have a reliable foothold.
These emboldened fringes of German politics, propelled by a significant portion of the electorate that opposes migration, Berlin’s and Brussels’ green-transition plans, and support for Ukraine, will frustrate durable coalitions among mainstream parties. That is an ominous sign just a few months before three state elections in eastern Germany and with a national election on the horizon.