The reelection of Donald Trump and the collapse of the governing coalition in Germany means that the Franco-Polish tandem must become the EU’s engine.

By early 2025, France and Poland will have signed the so-called “Nancy Treaty”, a holistic bilateral agreement expected to foster strategic cooperation in areas ranging from security and economy to energy and culture. On a symbolic note, France will also be the partner country of the 2025 edition of the increasingly influential Warsaw Security Forum.

Despite renewed activity in the Weimar format (a platform comprising Paris, Berlin, and Warsaw) the rapprochement between France and Poland stems partly from the difficult relations the two countries have with Germany. The Franco-German relationship has been characterized by frustration for many years, as has the Berlin-Warsaw relationship. The latter has gone through a series of crises, including disputes over compensation for World War II losses, Nord Stream pipelines, military support for Ukraine, and EU border management.

Franco-Polish cooperation illustrates Paris’ shift to the East over the past two years and the increasing role of Warsaw in that context, a development that Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has skilfully exploited to place himself at the heart of the European game. His role will be enhanced soon, as the country will take over the presidency of the Council of the European Union in January 2025.

Additionally, the transatlantic partnership will be facing a new US administration led by Donald Trump. Warsaw believes it is the best advocate to maintain Trump’s engagement in Europe, given its record 4.7% GDP defense spending for 2025, largely directed toward purchases of American equipment. However, members of the Polish strategic community and politicians from the ruling coalition increasingly perceive the United States’ prioritization of other theaters at Europe’s expense as a structural trend in American foreign policy. 

Tusk’s recent call for the EU to stop “geopolitical outsourcing” and rely more on its members echoes Paris’ long-standing position. Strengthening the European mutual defense clause is imperative, and France and Poland form a complementary duo to serve as the standard-bearers of the EU’s deterrence policy. Poland has emerged as the EU’s leading military force in terms of personnel, while Paris, as the only capital among the twenty-seven with nuclear capabilities, has affirmed that its nuclear deterrence is “a critical element of defence of the European continent”.

Poland, which buys American and South Korean military equipment above all, should acquire French submarines and torpedoes to equip its navy to support the European defense-industrial base. In turn, France should be proactive in helping Poland to counter cognitive warfare led by Russian actors and should increase its military presence in the country.

Today’s momentum in Franco-Polish relations must not be wasted. The pair could well face domestic turbulence: the government in Paris is hanging on by a thread, and Tusk's party will be put to the test in a disputed presidential election in the spring of 2025.