Europe Still Matters to the United States

Throughout the 2024 election campaign, foreign policy took a back seat to domestic issues of the economy, immigration, reproductive rights, and the state of American democracy itself. The Middle East, China, and, to a lesser extent, the Ukraine war and threats posed by Russia dominated the limited foreign policy discussion on the debate stage and the campaign trail. The incoming Trump administration may seek to prioritize domestic issues, but international challenges and crises will inevitably intrude on its agenda.

In recent years, the Democratic and Republican parties advanced the idea that China poses the greatest challenge to the United States and should be the primary focus of American foreign policy. Advocates for this approach maintain that Beijing seeks hegemony in Asia and ultimately hopes to overtake the United States as the dominant global power. This view gave rise to efforts to “pivot” to Asia and to policies that challenge China directly, even if action to contain a new Middle East crisis always seems to displace the pivot.

The complex challenges China poses to the United States and the international order are justifiably a priority, but some “China First” advocates, especially among certain Republicans, take this Indo-Pacific focus to extremes, suggesting that the United States should focus on China to the exclusion of other regions and threats. In their view, Kremlin aggression in Ukraine and broader threats to Europe should be recognized but not prioritized. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, who is likely to play a role in shaping the second Trump administration’s foreign and defense policy, has been leading this charge to narrow the scope and reach of American foreign policy. He has argued, for example, that aid to Ukraine was “a delusion” and that “Ukraine should not be the focus” of US foreign policy despite the clear threat that Russian actions pose to 70 years of European peace, prosperity, and stability and to broader international norms of respect for sovereignty, human rights, and the rule of law. Colby and others who see the world through a Chinese Communist Party-centric lens, including the authors of the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, claim that their “China First” approach would serve American interests by putting American security, freedom, and prosperity front and center.

There is no doubt that the United States’ relationship with China and deterrence of its aggressive regional ambitions will be central to global peace and stability in the decades ahead. But it is also true that vital US national interests in security, freedom, and prosperity cannot be achieved by a narrow, single-minded focus on China. It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of the transatlantic relationship to advancing these interests and the increasingly close links between threats from China and those from other US strategic adversaries.

“China First” advocates argue that China represents the US’s “top external threat” due to its immense economy and its desire to dominate Asia and the global economy. But foreign policy is more than deterring threats; it is as much or more about seizing opportunities to advance national interests. By looking only through the lens of threats, proponents of a “China First” approach ignore where the United States has the greatest opportunities today to boost its prosperity, enhance its economic and military security, and sustain a politically stable world in which freedom is valued and defended. Those opportunities remain in and with Europe.

The United States and the EU maintain the largest bilateral trade and investment relationship and continue to build the world’s most closely integrated economic relationship, one worth more than $6 trillion in foreign affiliate sales. This relationship is a driving force in the global economy, as reflected in the fact that either ally is the largest trade and investment partner for most countries. The United States and the EU together account for more than a third of global trade in goods and services and a third of global purchasing power. More than10 million people are directly employed in the United States and Europe because of transatlantic trade and investment, and another 16 million are indirectly employed. US investment in the EU is four times higher than that in the Asia-Pacific region, while EU investment in the United States is 10 times greater than that in China and India combined.

Beyond this dominant economic relationship, the United States and Europe remain indispensable political, economic, and security partners in addressing global challenges. The US-EU Trade and Technology Council coordinates global approaches to policies on both issues and deepens relations based on shared democratic values. Both parties are also strengthening semiconductor supply chains, confronting China’s non-market practices, working to shape new technologies, and sharing information on investment trends that could pose vulnerabilities to common adversaries. Both are also collaborating on building a partnership on mining, recycling, and processing of critical minerals needed for the world’s energy transition.

Today, as it has for more than 70 years, US and European cooperation expands the global reach of democracy and freedom. European support reinforces US policies that addresses common challenges such as Russian aggression, Chinese aggression and economic coercion, terrorism, synthetic drugs, climate change, and threats to human health. The United States and Europe share intelligence, conduct joint military exercises, maintain freedom of navigation, support human rights, and limit Chinese, Russian, and other malign influences. When Red Sea maritime passage is restricted by Houthi militias, threatening global trade flows, forces from the United States and Europe confront the threat together. Both provide 80% of the world’s development assistance and 70% of its humanitarian funding. In short, the US-European partnership, rooted in mutual trust and common values, remains the most vital partnership for tackling the full range of today’s global challenges.

Given the opportunities that the transatlantic relationship offers the United States to advance its global interests, and given the unique threat that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine poses to those interests, dismissing the war in Europe as a “just and noble cause” that Washington lacks the capacity to support, is foreign policy myopia. The war in Ukraine is a defining struggle that will shape Russian, Chinese, and other potential foes’ understanding of US willingness to defend its friends and its values. For the United States to step back from this struggle would send other potential adversaries a signal that Washington lacks the ability and will to defend its core interests and that a determined, persistent opponent can prevail. The country would also rightly face history’s judgment for dereliction of duty for an approach to foreign policy that reflects fatalism, not realism.

The United States fought two world wars in Europe in the 20th century because Americans understood that their prosperity and security depended on a peaceful and prosperous Europe that shares democratic principles. This is no less true today. The United States must defend and advance its core economic and political interests in Europe while also confronting China’s challenges to Western interests and values. And it can do so more effectively with Europe than by acting alone.

The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.