Energy Dominance or Renewable Resilience?

More than 60 countries, including the United States, will gather in London on April 24–25 to discuss the future of global energy security. Trade and geopolitics, never totally absent from such debates, now loom large. The summit is likely to highlight a fundamental clash between American and European priorities. 

On one side, the United States is now pushing for deeper global dependence on its oil and gas exports. On the other, European countries and the EU are seeking ways to reduce their reliance on imported fossil fuels while keeping energy prices affordable and maintaining their competitiveness. Though Europe is steadily (if unevenly) investing in decarbonization through clean power, energy retrofits, and EVs, the reality is that 58% of the EU’s energy needs were still met by net imports of fossil fuels in 2024. Even under a robust renewable power growth scenario, Europe could still depend on energy imports for 43% of its energy consumption in 2033, meaning the geopolitical risks that it faces now for its energy security are at least medium-term concerns. And EU-level plans like RePowerEU and the Clean Industrial Deal have pivoted Europe away from Russian fuels and positioned decarbonization as a lever of growth, but they have not coalesced into a comprehensive energy security strategy. 

Also, neither Russia nor China will be at the summit, though both are critically enmeshed in European and global energy security. China’s absence is a symptom of broader economic security challenges: In addition to its trade showdown with the US, Beijing is locked in a dispute with the British government over the nationalization of the UK’s last (and Chinese-owned) steelworks, a critical node in the British industrial supply chain. 

The clash between US and European priorities is not merely about strategy. Europe has urgent decisions to make about how to deal with the Trump administration as the clock ticks on its 90-day suspension of reciprocal tariffs. Rebuffed when it offered to simply buy more US liquefied natural gas (LNG)—which it will likely do anyway—Europe has also proposed investing EU funds in US LNG plants and other tactics. It is now hedging on imposing sanctions on Russian LNG, and some EU businesses and energy providers are loudly calling to restore access to Russian pipeline gas as an immediate source of cheap energy. Finally, energy policy alignment is a key item on the agenda in the EU-UK reset that will kick off in May. 

Without a unified strategy for how to deal with US pressure, Europe risks losing control over its energy security—again.

Former UK Energy Minister Charles Hendry and others have floated the idea of transatlantic cooperation on global energy “abundance”. The United States and Europe could acknowledge their differences but support—even invest in—developing each other’s respective domestic energy sources, with a renewed focus on affordability, availability, and diversification rather than decarbonization. But recent US actions have laid bare the limits of this approach. While US Energy Secretary Chris Wright initially included renewables in his “all of the above” approach to energy policy, President Donald Trump's January executive order freezing new offshore wind leases, followed by the abrupt April 16 stop order on the Empire Wind 1 project—a fully permitted, foreign-funded offshore wind farm—suggest that the US energy agenda increasingly views renewables not as assets, but as liabilities to its fossil fuel dominance.

That Empire Wind 1 was backed by billions of dollars in Norwegian-led investment underscores a more troubling reality: Even attracting friendly foreign capital, supposedly a major goal of Trump’s trade and economic agenda, can run into ideological opposition in Washington. European energy firms investing billions in LNG infrastructure have not yet faced such roadblocks. Increasingly, it appears that the Trump administration’s “energy dominance” policy is not merely about ensuring cheap domestic energy or about reducing trade deficits. It is rather a global strategy that adds US LNG and oil exports to an arsenal that includes energy sanctions and strategic investments in critical infrastructure abroad that Washington uses for influence, diplomacy, and leverage with allies and foes alike.

The stakes are high for Europe. The continent’s vulnerability to foreign fossil fuel imports was laid bare during the 2021–2023 energy crisis, when surging post-COVID-19 demand, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and its subsequent weaponization of its position as the dominant energy supplier in Europe sent prices skyward. Nearly eleven million Europeans were pushed into energy poverty, and industrial output suffered declines from which it has yet to recover. US LNG became a critical alternative, but also a risky and expensive one. 

Now, Europe faces the uncomfortable reality of straddling not one, but two unreliable fossil fuel powers. Based on an analysis of Eurostat data, in 2021 the EU met about 18% of its total energy consumption needs through imports of Russian oil (8%) and gas (10%) and 4% through American oil (3%) and gas (1%). By 2024, Russian imports fell to meeting only slightly more than 3% (less than 1% oil, 3% gas) of EU energy needs, but the United States accounted for 8% (5% oil, 3% gas) and is on track to grow. The near total replacement of pipeline gas by LNG in this mix is a major source of vulnerability: European electricity prices are particularly sensitive to LNG price swings and thus to geopolitical risks.

US President Donald Trump’s administration is now leveraging this reliance. Last month it demanded $350 billion in EU energy purchases as a condition for easing trade tensions—an amount roughly equivalent to all the EU’s annual energy imports combined. Unable to comply, the Commission has tried to accommodate the United States with ideas such as grouped LNG purchases and investment of EU funds into US LNG infrastructure. But these are questionable moves that would deepen its long-term dependence and send the wrong signal about Europe’s commitment to energy sovereignty, to say nothing of its climate goals. Recent discussions with EU Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič suggest that the Administration was burned by previous Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s trade promises during the first Trump administration, and that it is seeking hard commitments this time around. 

To reclaim agency over its energy future while faced with these risks, Europe needs a clear-eyed, pragmatic strategy. Four policy shifts are especially urgent:

• Push the private sector’s role in US energy deals: Rather than directly facilitate costly, long-term LNG contracts or subsidize US infrastructure with public funds, Europe needs to let its private sector lead and emphasize energy company deals and European firms’ long-term investments in US oil and gas production.
• Take advantage of Russian weakness: While Europe has slashed pipeline imports, Russian LNG shipments have quietly surged over the past two years. Brussels has delayed a full ban, hoping to retain some leverage in talks with Washington. It is also sending mixed signals to Moscow, having indicated it will finally publish a plan in May on how to decouple entirely from Russian fossil fuels by 2027. The drop in global oil prices provoked by the US-led trade wars is putting intense fiscal pressure on Moscow that is not likely to abate soon. The EU should use this to extract concessions on both prices between now and 2027 and favorable outcomes in Ukraine.
• Strengthen cooperation with the United Kingdom: The London summit is an opportunity to reinvigorate EU-UK energy cooperation post-Brexit. London remains committed to net zero and could be a key partner in pushing a renewables-led vision of energy security. A common front on US LNG imports would prevent Washington from driving a wedge between the two.
• Prioritize investments in domestic resilience: Ultimately, Europe must focus inward. Germany has smartly pledged to cut electricity prices through tax relief and grid-fee reductions, but this will not be enough. Electric vehicle adoption must accelerate. The EU’s Clean Industrial Deal aims to electrify heavy industry, from steel and chemicals to food processing. The technologies to do so exist; what is needed is scale, political will, and massive amounts of funding. With luck, the forthcoming summit will give these issues new urgency within the Commission and national governments.

If Europe fails to act, it risks repeating the mistakes of the past: building its energy system around partners whose priorities diverge sharply from its own. Its leaders must use their limited leverage with the United States and Russia to extract deals that promote its long-term energy security.