Bulgaria’s Latest Elections Will Not Solve Its Long-Running Political Crisis
On June 9, on the same day as the European Parliament elections, Bulgarians will also vote for their own legislature—for the sixth time in the past three years. The outcome is unlikely to bring any lasting solution to the political crisis in their country.
Going into government with the center-right Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) party after the last election in July 2023 was a major compromise for the voters of the progressive coalition We Continue the Change–Democratic Bulgaria (PP-DB). The latter was seen until recently as the only genuine pro-West alternative to the old status quo embodied by GERB.
The election campaign has deepened the divisions between PP-DB and GERB. Combined with the voting fatigue experienced by the population, their confrontation diminishes the chance of a next government based on shared pro-West values.
GERB polled between 8% and 10% ahead of PP-DB in May. According to one poll, it will increase its support from the last elections with 25.4%, while PP-DB will lose votes and come in second with 17.5%. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), another old status quo party, and the pro-Russia, far-right Revival party are expected to win around 15% each. A new government between PP-DB and GERB is unlikely, and the latter has been demonstrating its closeness with the DPS.
GERB being in the next government will preserve the status quo, with the politically weakened PP-DB likely to be in opposition. In 2021, PP-DB first came to power with the explicit pledge to dismantle the mode of governing of the GERB leader Boyko Borissov. It lost public support as a result of then cooperating with his party, not least given how GERB then treated it in government negotiations.
While GERB cultivates the image of a pro-West center-right party, the shadow of opaque political calculations and corruption scandals that is attached to it remains a concern for Bulgaria’s Western partners.
The United States has placed the DPS’s Delyan Peevski and GERB’s Vladislav Goranov, the former minister of finance, on its anti-corruption sanctions list. Throughout the campaign, politicians of both parties have argued that the list does not have any judicial effect in Bulgaria and that the US government was misled. This denial narrative aims at removing any doubt about corruption in the eyes of their voters.
Suspicion of influence by Russia and Serbia on Bulgaria’s decision-making also raises concerns about the country’s geopolitical orientation after the elections.
Suspicion of influence by Russia and Serbia on Bulgaria’s decision-making also raises concerns about the country’s geopolitical orientation after the elections. The history of the three previous governments led by GERB and the actions of the current caretaker government of Prime Minister Dimitar Glavchev, a former GERB member, hint at what to expect if the party gets back into power.
Most recently, on May 23, just before the United Nations General Assembly voted on a resolution on the Srebrenica genocide, Glavchev at the last minute instructed Bulgaria’s ambassador to the UN to abstain even though the country was one of the resolution’s co-authors and had expressed consistent support for it. (However, the ambassador did not follow this order and voted in line with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ long-standing policy, which is one more indication of the situation in Sofia.)
If GERB comes first as the polls suggest, it will likely seek a coalition with the DPS, and partnering with Revival too would not be off the table. If the latter is included in the government, this will play to the widespread Russophile elements in the country, while the majority supports Bulgaria’s EU and NATO commitments.
There is little chance of the elections producing a stable government. This will be a step back for Bulgaria’s democratic development, with no genuine priority given to reforms or the fight against corruption. Even though the next government, under most combination of parties, would nominally be pro-EU and pro-NATO, it would be less eager to act when it comes to curbing Russian economic, cultural, or political influence.
Bulgaria would keep its declared Western orientation with its commitments to the EU and NATO. However, there is a chance that it would not support letting Ukraine use Western weapons to attack Russian territory. Borissov has declared himself against such a possibility, and this is also the position of President Rumen Radev, whose statements often favor Russia. Radev’s recent visit to Hungary shows that Bulgaria’s government may seek ideological allies when it comes to future EU and NATO decisions regarding support for Ukraine.
Ultimately, while Bulgaria’s strategic interests include enhanced security in the Black Sea and the Western Balkans, the country’s continued political instability risks contributing to decision-making that favors Russia’s negative influence in the region.