Trump, Ukraine, and Europe’s Three Security Priorities

Recent developments in US policy toward Ukraine, Russia, and Europe have upended the continent’s preconceived ideas about its own security. Despite President Donald Trump’s campaign promises, few anticipated such a swift and far-reaching transformation of the transatlantic landscape. In less than a month, negotiations for a ceasefire in Ukraine along with multiple bilateral crises have reshaped European thinking. 

The continent is not standing idly by. At the EU and member-state levels, leaders have announced decisive steps to increase financial and military support to Ukraine and significantly boost defense spending. High-level dialogue on nuclear deterrence, overhauls of defense procurement processes, and innovative financing mechanisms for the European defense sector are among the flurry of initiatives that have recently emerged. The proliferation of analyses on a potential US withdrawal from Europe and policy proposals for a concrete ceasefire framework for Ukraine also illustrate the shifting policy dynamics.

This paper identifies the three priorities for Europe in this evolving transatlantic security environment. It outlines short- and long-term challenges, and offers options for confronting the most pressing and immediate challenges: having a say in Ukraine’s future, redefining the European security order beyond Ukraine, and building democratic support for the costly and difficult decisions that lie ahead.

The Leverage Dilemma 

Negotiations for a ceasefire in Ukraine are currently taking place without Europe. The US effort may fail given the gap between Russian and Ukrainian demands, but it could also alter the continent’s security environment and leave Europeans to deal with the consequences. 

An honest assessment of the situation leads Europeans to realize that they have limited ability to influence US decision-making. Leverage will be essential if they are to have any impact at all on Washington’s approach to ending the war. Trump and several senior members of his administration may question Europe’s willingness to seek peace, leaving transatlantic coordination superficial, but Europe holds some cards to defend its interests in negotiations. 

The first leverage point concerns Europe’s necessary involvement in sustaining any agreed ceasefire. Trump and his administration will want to ensure that any deal does not collapse before 2029 while they are in power. The prospect of this, combined with Europe’s strategically communicating the dangers that may lead to such an outcome, could help ensure that the continent has a role in formulating a political and military solution for Ukraine. 

As an initial step, Europeans should again endorse Trump’s objective and emphasize publicly and privately that they want his plan to succeed. But Europeans need also to demonstrate that a sustainable ceasefire requires security guarantees for Ukraine and that they stand ready to provide them. On this issue, Europeans have worked on a set of options to present to Washington. These include weaving a web of bilateral guarantees between European states and Ukraine based on individual capacities; using existing formats of minilateral defense cooperation, such as the Franco-British CJEF (Combined Joint Expeditionary Force) to provide, if necessary, an operational component; and establishing a coalition of the willing to deploy troops to monitor the implementation of a ceasefire agreement. A less ambitious engagement would feature a rapid reaction force based in a neighboring NATO ally. France and the United Kingdom could lead such an “International Security Force for Ukraine”, with other European countries participating. It would aim to guarantee the success of a deal that Trump negotiates as long as the United States provides political backing for it, especially in talks with Russia, and limited military support through logistics and intelligence. Europe’s key challenge is to make Trump understand that these commitments constitute a lower risk for him than a collapse of any deal he makes.

Beyond a role in enforcing a sustainable ceasefire, Europe also has leverage from its capacity to shape battlefield dynamics in Ukraine. Whatever the course of negotiations, helping Ukraine stand its ground on the battlefield will frustrate the Kremlin’s efforts to achieve its goals at a time when the conflict’s evolution favors Moscow. The recent, temporary suspension of US military and technical assistance to Ukraine bolstered this advantage.

Europeans may try to compensate for the loss of some capabilities, but replacing all American military assistance is impossible. Still, ways to meet Ukraine’s most critical needs in the short term have been found. The real dilemma concerns the next phase of a peace process. If a ceasefire is reached, Europeans may be tempted to purchase US weapons systems to sustain military aid to Ukraine. This could, in turn, strengthen the Ukrainian army’s capacity to repel future Russian attacks and create a business deal for US arms manufacturers. That opportunity could serve as an incentive for the Trump administration to insist that any agreement is respected and to reject any Russian demands for capping Ukrainian military capabilities. On the other hand, with limited resources, Europeans will want to prioritize their own industrial base and will be wary of increasing their dependence on the United States. The rise of anti-Americanism in European politics may also render purchases of US armaments politically unpalatable.

Europe’s Long-Term Security Challenges

As the endeavor to leverage European power to influence negotiations on Ukraine unfolds, the campaign to rapidly strengthen European defense is also underway. This broader and more comprehensive effort has two main goals: building European military capabilities and reinventing a common strategy for the continent’s defense.

Regarding the first aim, European defense has already made strides in recent years. EU member states spent €326 billion on defense in 2024, a 30% increase in just three years, and the just-launched ReArm Europe plan is expected to unleash about another €800 billion over the next four years. Germany’s plans to increase its defense spending could mobilize even more significant resources that could fundamentally boost European military capabilities.

Such investment alone, however, is insufficient. The effectiveness of Europe’s defense efforts hinges on a strategic reassessment of its role in transatlantic security. The reliance on US strategic, political, and military leadership within NATO has made the alliance’s European members intellectually lazy when considering the European security order. NATO and a seemingly unwavering US commitment to the alliance were taken for granted despite the long-held recognition that American strategic priorities were changing. Europeans consciously sleepwalked into a conceptual vacuum in part because some of them feared that even talk of less US leadership on security matters would irritate Washington.

Ironically, developing concrete plans to defend Europe with a much reduced US contribution is the best way to preserve the transatlantic bond. The Trump administration views allies that lack military capability and shirk strategic responsibility as burdens, while it may seek deals with those countries in a better position to defend themselves. Europeans can capitalize on this more transactional transatlantic relationship by providing a transition plan for their own security. Such a roadmap should include plans for making conventional defense and filling key positions such as the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) European responsibilities. Politically, the United States could be offered the option of a constructive abstention in the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s decision-making body, on tasks that require only European resources. A serious plan to gradually phase out US contributions to European security should still include American security guarantees and logistics and intelligence support as contributions to collective deterrence and defense to avoid a chaotic transition. Europeans must recognize in the long term that the US commitment to NATO will not revert to previous levels. They must design a new transatlantic security partnership centered on Europe.

The continent’s Russia policy constitutes an even more complex, and controversial, issue. Since 2022, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has justifiably overshadowed all other political, economic, and security considerations. As a result, Europeans have been unable and unwilling to define an all-encompassing collective strategy toward Russia that addresses their broader strategic interests. And the Kremlin has taken the position that it has “nothing to discuss” with Europe. This opens the way for the Trump administration’s negotiations with Moscow to decide Russia’s future role in European security without European input.

Europeans cannot afford to outsource their Russia policy to the United States or any other power. This does not imply, as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán recently suggested, that the EU should immediately start bilateral talks with Moscow. Rather, the priority should be defining key European interests to be defended and promoted in any future engagement with Russia. These interests must include Ukraine’s sovereignty, European security, EU-Russia political and economic relations, and strategic competition in the Western Balkans, the Caucasus and the Black Sea, and the Arctic.

Europeans must also develop a common assessment of Russian military power and its ability to further undermine European security. Analysts and officials argue that the invasion of Ukraine has profoundly weakened Russia, in part due to hundreds of thousands of casualties, but that its army will be stronger at the end of the war than at the outbreak of conflict. A joint understanding of the nature of the Russian military threat will help calibrate European defense policies and hone communication to European publics.

The Need for Honesty

Calls for Europeans to “do more” for Ukraine and their own defense are widely accepted. But this plea for action often overshadows difficult policy trade-offs that European policymakers must convince their publics to accept. 

NATO membership for Ukraine is off the table for the foreseeable future. The Trump administration’s rejection of it at least provides clarity for the country and the alliance. At the EU level, member states lack the courage to be similarly frank. The bloc regularly reiterates its commitment to Ukrainian accession, and the EU Commission has even announced that it could happen by 2030 if reforms continue. But Kyiv’s road to EU integration will be bumpy. Brussels must start its process through treaty reforms, including that of the unanimity principle on foreign affairs and other key policies, since Ukrainian membership would significantly alter the balance of power within the EU. In addition, many existing instruments, such as agricultural and cohesion policy, would require massive investment if extended to Ukraine. Lastly, all member states would need to approve Ukrainian membership through parliamentary ratification or a referendum, neither of which offers a guarantee. But just considering enlargement has its benefits. The process alone binds Ukraine closer to Europe, which gains from closer ties with the country that now possesses the continent’s most combat-experienced army. Enlargement is a geopolitical tool, and stopping the process would send the wrong signal to Moscow. But as the risk of Washington’s using EU membership for Ukraine as a bargaining chip rises, European leaders must be honest with their publics about the challenges that Ukraine’s EU accession poses. Leaders must also clarify their redlines for membership to avoid endangering the entire European project.

This openness is necessary because Europeans will need to bear the political, financial, and, potentially, military costs of the next phase of a war that has already raged in their neighborhood for three years. The idea that “Ukraine’s security is Europe’s security” has been at the heart of Europe’s support for the country since the full-scale invasion. But the rallying cry’s real meaning is often understated or misunderstood. Recent polls confirm broad support across Europe for Ukraine even if the willingness to bear the financial and military burden is more fragile and varies significantly among countries. That between half and two-thirds of the British, French, Germans, and Poles believe that Russia will attack another country if it conquers Ukrainian territory should give hope to European leaders, especially when they face the daunting challenge of sustaining public support for Ukraine amid rising domestic economic pressures and a potential US disengagement that could force Europe to spend €250 billion on defense and recruit 300,000 additional soldiers. French President Emmanuel Macron set an unfortunate example by avoiding this stark reality when he explained that the investment demanded by the new geopolitical environment would not be covered not by new taxes but by “reforms, choices, and courage”. Courage, however valuable, may not be enough to pay the bill. 

The Way Ahead

As the Trump administration shifts US policy toward Ukraine and Europe, the latter faces urgent security challenges. Short-term adaptability and long-term strategic transformation are needed to overcome them. Europe must leverage its role in Ukraine’s defense, assert influence in ceasefire negotiations, and invest in autonomous military capabilities. A stronger European defense architecture that is backed by sufficient financial resources and updated strategies is essential for reducing dependence on Washington but preserving transatlantic ties. Equally important are honest public discussions on the implications of vastly expanded investment in European security and Ukraine’s EU accession. Europeans need to understand that they are all in it together.