Japan’s Foreign Policy Priorities

When Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba entered the White House on February 7, he became the first leader of an Asian country to meet in person with Donald Trump. The visitor was another leader with unconventional perspectives on foreign and national security policies. Ishiba, who was elected prime minister last October, was known before assuming office for proposing an “Asian NATO” and a revision of the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Japan watchers wonder if he will stay true to those ideas as prime minister.

One clue to that is his policy speeches to the Diet, addresses that are traditionally given at the beginning of ordinary and extraordinary parliamentary sessions. The occasions are the most significant and official opportunities to understand a prime minister’s foreign policy stance, and they involve fielding questions from ruling and opposition party members. Such speeches highlight a government’s priorities and provide a foundation for debates in the Diet. Ishiba has delivered three policy speeches to date.

October’s general election resulted in the loss of a parliamentary majority for the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its junior partner, the Komeito party. Still, both remain in power even if they must now seek the cooperation of the opposition on every individual bill if any is to be approved.

This article analyzes the outline of Ishiba’s foreign and national security policies in this new political landscape. The analysis is based on the prime minister’s policy speeches in the Diet. It examines the similarities and differences between Ishiba’s policies and those of the previous administration, and explores the ability of opposition parties to influence the new administration in Tokyo.

Japan-US Relations

In his second policy speech in the Diet on November 29, Ishiba stated that “Japan-US security arrangements serve as the cornerstone of our diplomatic and security policy” and affirmed his commitment to further strengthening the unwavering alliance between the two countries. This is a consistent with previous government’s stance and was reflected in the prime minister’s meeting with Trump. The two leaders agreed at that meeting to collaborate closely to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific and to bolster the Japan-US alliance. But there were concerns that Ishiba’s long-advocated idea to revise the SOFA, most recently laid out in a September 2024 paper published by the Hudson Institute, could complicate the bilateral relationship. The prime minister helped dispel the worries, however, by using vaguer language to address the issue in that second Diet speech. “We will promote the shared use by the Self-Defense Forces of US Forces in Japan facilities and areas, while also addressing various issues arising from the stationing of US forces in Japan,” he said. A government statement that followed that speech clarified that the prime minister’s September paper represented only his personal view, not the government’s official position. Nevertheless, the SOFA has not been revised since its ratification by the Diet in 1960, and any update now is unlikely given the need for parliamentary approval at a time when the government lacks a majority. In addition, a revision that seeks a more balanced bilateral relationship could result in Japan’s bearing greater responsibility for its defense and for regional security. It remains unclear whether Japan can shoulder this additional burden given financial challenges and questionable public support.

The Indo-Pacific

In his first policy speech to the Diet, Ishiba committed himself to “uphold the international order based on the rule of law and lead efforts to further ensure safety and stability” in a free and open Indo-Pacific, a concept originally proposed by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The first manifestation of Ishiba’s effort in this regard occurred last November at a meeting between the prime minister and Chinese President Xi Jinping during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Peru. Both leaders affirmed their shared direction of promoting a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” and building “constructive and stable Japan-China relations”. They also confirmed a desire to strengthen communication at all levels of government and people-to-people exchanges. But at the same time, Ishiba expressed serious concerns about the situation in the East and South China seas, as well as the increased activity of Chinese military forces. Under these complex circumstances, Ishiba’s idea of an Asian NATO represents an additional complicating factor, perhaps explaining why it was not addressed in his policy speeches. Instead, discussions on regional security in Asia are now expected to continue within the LDP rather than within the government. 

The feasibility of an Asian NATO is, in any case, doubtful due to its frosty international reception. Beijing has firmly opposed it. Even Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has stated that his country does not envision such a grouping. And the US position remains unclear, especially given the Trump administration’s increasingly vocal skepticism of the transatlantic alliance. For its part, Japan would need a constitutional amendment to join a collective defense system, an impossibility for the Ishiba government to secure without a parliamentary majority. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the prime minister appears to be moderating his long-held positions on revising SOFA and establishing an Asian NATO. He is instead adopting a pragmatic approach that focuses on urgent challenges in the current geopolitical landscape.

Other Foreign Policy Issues

Ishiba has reaffirmed the previous Japanese administration’s policy to impose sanctions on Russia and support Ukraine. In a late December phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the prime minister himself reaffirmed Japan’s continued backing for a just and lasting peace. The country’s role in this process includes helping maintain G7 unity on the issue, ensuring that Ukraine participates in ceasefire negotiations, and preventing an outcome that sends a signal to authoritarian countries that changing the status quo by force is permissible. At the same time, anticipating a potential ceasefire, the Japanese government is carefully considering its contributions to Ukraine’s recovery, including humanitarian assistance, support for economic reconstruction, and possible involvement in peacekeeping operations.

Regarding relations between Japan and South Korea, whose normalization marks its 60th anniversary this year, Ishiba expressed in his first policy speech to the Diet his intention to build on trust established by the previous government, expand bilateral cooperation, and enhance trilateral collaboration involving the United States. Recent political tumult in Seoul, however, may disrupt these plans, a potentially significant setback as North Korean threats and a fragile, regional security environment will persist. Trump may not support multilateral frameworks, but deepening trilateral cooperation is an essential strategy for ensuring stability.

Bolstering Defense

Ishiba also emphasized in that first Diet speech that he would “confront the realities of the severe security environment and, based on the [government’s] National Security Strategy and other frameworks, steadily advance the fundamental strengthening of Japan's defense capabilities.” The National Security Strategy, which was adopted under the Fumio Kishida administration in 2022, calls for Japan’s fiscal year 2027 budget for defense and complementary initiatives to reach 2% of the country’s fiscal year 2022 GDP. Spending is to include acquiring counterstrike capabilities and addressing new domains such as space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum. But securing the financial resources to do this remains a significant political challenge. This year's tax-related legislation will provide some of the necessary funds, but more will be needed. The Ishiba government’s Active Cyber Defense Bill, submitted to the Diet in February and aimed at enhancing cybersecurity capabilities to the same level as those of the United States and European countries, can be seen as a further step toward strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities. But it, too, will need financing.
 

Policy Coordination with the Opposition

Deliberations on the budget and tax-related legislation will be the primary focus of the Diet’s current session, which began in January. The ruling coalition plans to get parliamentary approval for its budget before the new fiscal year begins on April 1 while discussions on tax-related legislation take place simultaneously. But all the talks may need to overcome significant challenges since some opposition parties reject proposed tax increases to fund defense. How the government and, individually, the LDP and Komeito negotiate with these parties will be crucial to understanding the direction of the administration's foreign and national security policies.

Challenges Ahead

Despite recent political changes, Japan is pursuing consistent foreign and national security policies in an effort to enhance security and regional stability centered on the Japan-US alliance. Tokyo is doing this while strengthening its own defense and enhancing cooperation with like-minded countries. Amid rapidly changing geopolitical circumstances, the new Japanese government, as the prime minister’s Diet speeches reflect, is working to continue its commitment to Ukraine, manage its relationship with China, and develop its defense capabilities. But all these objectives will confront significant challenges.