Debating Defense

Germany’s February 23 snap elections mark a significant turning point in its political landscape. For the first time in decades, defense is taking center stage in the campaigning. Germany has historically relied on NATO and the United States for security while prioritizing economic success through trade, particularly with China, cheap Russian energy, and social welfare. The Kremlin’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, shattered this post-Cold War framework, which left Germany with a reputation for being a large version of Switzerland. As a result, all major parties address defense policy in their election platforms.

Seven parties are expected to win seats in the Bundestag, but only five—the Christian Democrats (CDU)/Christian Socialists (CSU), the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens, and the Free Democrats (FDP)—are potential partners in the next coalition government. Whoever is in power will have to grapple with key defense-related issues including the amount of defense spending, modernization of the Bundeswehr, Germany’s relationship with its allies and with NATO, support for Ukraine, and the EU’s potential role in defense.

The CDU/CSU

The two mainstream conservative parties, led by Friedrich Merz, likely the next chancellor, support NATO’s 2%-of-GDP minimum defense spending target and aim to promote investment efficiency. Their platform includes increasing the number of Bundeswehr personnel from 180,000 to 203,000, introducing compulsory national service with options for military or social and civil work, and creating a drone unit. They also propose a national security council, stronger ties with NATO and the United States, continued support for Ukraine, and tougher sanctions on Russia. The CDU/CSU are likely to be the senior partner in the next government, but they are also likely to have to compromise with one or two partners to form a coalition with support from a parliamentary majority.

The SPD

Current Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s party plans to allocate at least 2% of GDP to defense but has been unclear about funding after 2028, when a €100 billion special defense fund expires. The center-left SPD will find it challenging to de-prioritize social welfare spending for defense. The party prefers voluntary military service and aligns with the CDU on international cooperation and cautious support for Ukraine. But Social Democrats oppose giving Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine. A coalition with the CDU in a “grand coalition” still seems feasible based on shared defense priorities.

The Green Party

The Greens and their candidate for chancellor, Robert Habeck, currently economy and climate protection minister, advocate long-term defense spending to as much as 3.5% of GDP, partially financed through increased national debt. The party prioritizes modernizing the Bundeswehr and voluntary military service with enhanced incentives, details of which remain unclear. The Greens are committed to strong EU-NATO cooperation and robust support for Ukraine, and they advocate for delivering Taurus cruise missiles to the country, though this stance is absent from their official platform.

The Free Democrats (FDP)

The center-right FDP supports NATO’s 2%-of-GDP minimum spending target and endorses raising it if allies agree to do so. They advocate freezing social spending and reviewing development aid to prioritize defense, a proposal made by party leader Christian Lindner in 2024 but rejected by his coalition partners in the previous coalition. The FDP aims to make the Bundeswehr the EU’s strongest conventional force and supports creating a national security council. The party is the only one to back the immediate delivery of advanced weapons, including Taurus cruise missiles, to Ukraine. The FDP platform complements those of other centrist parties, making them a viable coalition partner.

Other Parties

The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is expected to perform well but remains politically isolated. No other major party will cooperate with them. The AfD offers vague defense policies that embrace better financing and equipment for the Bundeswehr, and supports lifting sanctions on Russia. They propose reopening Nord Stream 2 and resuming gas deals with Moscow. These positions place them far outside mainstream defense and security consensus.

Far-left parties are likely to struggle to gain enough votes for Bundestag representation. Their limited defense policies and alignment with the AfD on some issues, such as opposing sanctions on Russia, reduce their political influence.

The Quandary

Post-election coalition negotiations are expected to conclude by mid-April to ensure a new government is in place shortly thereafter. It will almost immediately face the challenge of drafting by the second half of the year a financial plan for the medium term, 2027-2029. That will spark pivotal debates on defense policy and mark a critical moment for setting national security priorities. An increased defense budget is a given; financing it may be the bigger challenge.

Dirk Schattschneider was a Marshall Memorial Fellow in 2003.