NATO: Strength in Unity

Kristine Berzina

Donald Trump inherits at the start of his second term a NATO alliance that has more members, is better funded, and is more capable and committed than it has been in decades. Unlike in 2019, when French President Emmanuel Macron deemed the alliance “brain dead”, today’s NATO is focused on deterring and defending its members from a Kremlin-led global club of aggressors.

The incoming administration, to ensure US security and prosperity, will benefit from a strong and motivated team of Atlantic allies. In NATO and with its individual members, the United States has greater reach and resources to stop aggression by adversaries. Russia and China, above all, collaborate closely to disrupt and usurp American hegemony, empowering Iran and North Korea in the process.

Not the Same NATO

Trump bragged in last year’s two presidential debates about having convinced, in his first term, NATO allies to increase defense spending. His threats—and, crucially, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine— kicked investment into higher gear. Only four alliance partners met the target of spending 2% of GDP on defense when Trump initially entered the White House. Four years later, nine countries met the threshold; 23 of the now 32 allies did so in 2024. Those facing the greatest security risks, perhaps unsurprisingly, have the highest defense spending, among them eastern flank countries that border Russia. Poland spends more than 4% of its GDP, more, in fact, than the United States. This commitment to rearm and innovate benefits Washington economically and strategically. NATO allies’ defense purchases from American manufacturers grew to $24 billion in 2023, part of a broader 55.9% increase in US foreign military sales over the previous year.

NATO has not only grown in number recently. It has also expanded its knowledge. The alliance’s newest members, Finland and Sweden, have well-funded and highly capable militaries trained in a doctrine of self-reliance and comprehensive security that the United States and other allies can absorb. NATO has also learned significant lessons for fighting with a wider range of equipment. This has come from more exercises and training, and from observing the Ukrainians’ strategy of integrating Soviet-era and Western weapons systems, such as in their “FrankenSAM” air defense.

The Return of Blocs

A strong and large NATO is an important counterweight to adversaries that are working together as never before. During the Biden years, Russia and China established a “no limits” partnership. Moscow uses North Korean troops in its war in Ukraine and tests Iranian drones and missiles against US-made systems there. The next generation of adversarial military leadership will be better prepared to fight the United States.

Trump’s first term scorned multilateral bodies in favor of direct bilateral talks. But Moscow and Beijing are moving in the opposite direction, establishing a club to counter the West. Their vision is attractive to many countries around the world: Russia hosted a BRICS summit in October 2024 that brought together leaders from 36 countries and even the UN secretary-general to meet with President Vladimir Putin, despite the International Criminal Court’s warrant for his arrest.

The US response to a rapidly intensifying collaboration among bad actors should not be to question its own alliances. Instead, the incoming administration should strengthen the alignment of free countries. NATO offers Trump prestige and a captive audience, and, therefore, a theater for his leadership and diplomatic success, both of which can be to Washington’s strategic benefit.

Alliance Challenges

At NATO, the second Trump administration’s main objectives will be to resolve the current war in Ukraine and reinforce European defense, win support for US policy toward China, and resolve festering intra-alliance gaps and conflicts on defense spending and military production. Its top concern should be stopping and deterring Russia’s aggression, which could extend to the alliance’s eastern flank. Trump has declared ending the war in Ukraine a priority, a goal he may accomplish in his first 100 days back in the Oval Office. But this will require working with European allies on military assistance and security guarantees for Kyiv and, potentially, negotiating a role for European peacekeeping troops. Both issues are highly controversial.

Maintaining peace in Ukraine is closely tied to the country’s potential NATO membership. The alliance affirmed Ukraine’s “irreversible” path to joining at last summer’s Washington summit, but Vice President JD Vance and incoming senior Pentagon official Elbridge Colby have expressed skepticism about that. For US allies on Russia’s borders, a durable European peace is impossible without Ukrainian NATO membership. A Ukraine outside the alliance would allow Putin to achieve one of his major strategic objectives and could incentivize Russia to continue military incursions into other neighboring countries.

China will be the second major NATO challenge for the United States. The incoming administration will likely prioritize the military threat that Beijing poses, potentially shifting defense resources from other theaters to address it. Many European allies understand the need to assume more of the burden for their own security, and greater production of military equipment and pre-positioning of troops in higher-risk areas is slowly moving forward. But maintaining a credible nuclear and conventional deterrent requires a meaningful US presence in Europe in the short and medium term. Frank transatlantic discussions on the division of labor will be needed.

The Trump team will also have to consider the best way to incorporate NATO into US policy toward China as the alliance takes an increasingly tough stance on Beijing. Last year’s summit declaration identified China as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine” and called out China’s malicious hybrid, cyber, and space activities and nuclear advancements. 

A third challenge will be addressing the defense investment gap in the alliance, which will only worsen if, as expected, Trump and NATO leaders push to increase the defense spending target at this year’s alliance summit in The Hague. Member states may also define consequences for allies that benefit from collective defense but do not sufficiently contribute to it. Trump’s earlier suggestion that the US would defend only those allies that spent enough on defense damaged NATO’s reputation as the gold standard of defense pacts. By extension, it also dented the entire alliance’s deterrence posture. The Trump administration would do better to work with allies to establish agreed consequences for insufficient defense contributions. 

Policy Recommendations

To show American strength and counter the rising ambitions of a Russian-led coalition of bad actors, the second Trump administration should:

  • prioritize a strong US presence in Europe in countries that are leaders in defense spending. Too much attention is placed on the laggards and too little credit is given to the members that exceed alliance targets. As the US balances its global posture and seeks to maintain a robust deterrent in the Atlantic, Washington should prioritize its presence in countries that lead NATO defense spending. This will benefit the militaries of Europe’s more ambitious countries through better training and preparation, and will serve as an incentive for others to invest more in their armed forces. This approach will not weaken NATO’s overall deterrence and defense posture, unlike threats to retract security commitments.

  • keep Ukraine’s path to NATO open. Kyiv’s desire to join the alliance reflects its attractive power and that of the United States. The incoming administration should want Ukraine’s considerable experience in and knowledge of fighting a 21st-century war to help shape the alliance. This will require maintaining a path for Ukrainian membership in any peace negotiations with Russia.
     
  • focus on collective tasks that affect security at home. The United States and its allies must put collective pressure on adversaries to dissuade hostile behavior on NATO territory. Allies should share information on threats (above and below threshold) and exchange best practices for preventing them. This will also involve:

  • deterring and responding to hybrid attacks. NATO must act against the increase in Russian sabotage and China-linked hybrid attacks, including the destruction of critical undersea infrastructure.
     
  • achieving a technological edge. The alliance should pool resources, funds, and talents to keep ahead of China’s technological developments.
     
  • preventing terrorism and managing threats from the Middle East. The changing political equilibrium in the Middle East increases the potential for terrorist attacks on US and European territory. NATO could be a forum for consultations on the Middle East, including on Iran and its nefarious activities, that would improve deterrence.

  • update defense spending targets and set enforceable defense spending floors. The 2014 Wales pledge to spend 2% of GDP on defense is insufficient to counter the threat of a Russia-China-Iran-North Korea coalition. Greater defense spending is essential but so is setting a floor. Consequences for failing to reach that minimum could include a reduced presence of US troops in peacetime or restricting access to NATO innovation funds or supplemental training opportunities.

     

  • address economic and supply chain security. Healthy supply chains are essential for ensuring defense. The second Trump administration should lead NATO efforts on collective investment in supply chains for economic, technological, and defense purposes. The White House could introduce an allied investment pledge, akin to that for defense spending, for critical minerals and energy resources to combine funds and know-how to develop resilient and competitive supply chains.