Success, With Caveats

On January 9, 2025, one month after the end of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the foreign ministers of the Transatlantic Quint (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany) met to discuss the situation. The Quint agreed to closely coordinate efforts to pursue the goals of the return of refugees—Europe’s primary concern—the lifting of sanctions, preservation of territorial unity, and a peaceful and inclusive transition. The end of the Al-Assad dynastic power clearly represented a victory for Türkiye. Ankara’s intervention—directly supporting the Syrian National Army (SNA) by providing sanctuary, training, money, and medical treatment, and by coordinating and indirectly backing also the Jihadist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—meant that the country played a crucial role. 

From a transatlantic perspective, there are numerous implications. For both the United States and the European Union, the defeat of Russia—although its actual scale still needs to be defined, as Moscow is trying to maintain at least one of its bases—and Iran is good news, both as a standalone issue and for its broader implications in theaters such as Ukraine. President-elect Donald Trump has already emphasized this connection directly, as he sees Russia’s defeat in Syria as an opportunity to bring Russians and Ukrainians to the negotiating table. Trump also pointed out that Syria is not a US priority, and that Americans should stay out of it. However, the idea that Washington can simply ignore what happens there is unrealistic. There will be pressure from Congress, for instance, to keep providing support to the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The resurgence of the Islamic State is also likely to push Washington to devote attention and resources. Aware of this, SDF leaders have urged Trump to leave US troops in northeast Syria. 

The president-elect has also described the Turkish intervention as an “unfriendly takeover”, a judgment that likely reflects Israeli influence on his perception of these geopolitical dynamics. Israel does not view Türkiye’s increased influence in Syria favorably. Furthermore, Ankara's apparent preparations to launch an offensive in the areas held by US-supported Kurdish SDF forces is problematic for Israel. 

That said, the systemic element remains. Regime change in Syria represents a defeat for Russia and Iran. For the transatlantic allies, this must be seen as a success. Additionally, there is a subtler, but nonetheless significant dynamic unfolding: any American administration, whether Democratic or Republican, is increasingly attentive to those countries that—through actions in important but secondary theaters where the United States is unwilling to engage directly—manage to limit the influence of Russia (and China). In recent years, Türkiye has succeeded in limiting Russia in Libya, Ukraine, the Southern Caucasus, and now Syria. Although Erdoğan remains a divisive figure in Washington, especially on Capitol Hill, Türkiye’s ability to achieve results in specific contexts is noted and appreciated. Quietly, for years, officials in Washington have praised Türkiye for its success in Libya supporting the legitimate Tripoli government against Russia-backed Khalifa Haftar—a role that many believed the EU and/or specific EU member states should have played.

The EU and its major member states view the Syrian issue mostly through the lens of migration and the return of Syrians to their country, which is now considered “safe”. Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohamad al-Jawlani), has linked the return of Syrians abroad to the lifting of sanctions. He will likely use the return of refugees as leverage to extract other concessions from Europeans as well. 

On December 16, during a visit to Türkiye, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen indicated that Ankara will receive an additional €1 billion to manage Syrian refugees. Even for the EU, Türkiye’s victory has multiple dimensions. A potentially pacified Syria is certainly of fundamental interest, although it remains to be seen how sustainable the current situation is. Should things worsen, it is unlikely that the EU would have the capacity—or the willingness—to intervene directly to restore order.

During his meeting with von der Leyen, Erdoğan expressed his desire to “revive” relations, stating that “Türkiye’s accession to the European Union remains a strategic objective.” This statement will undoubtedly cause problems, as this process is currently in stalemate. Türkiye’s victory in Syria will further strengthen its foreign policy assertiveness and will likely mean increased opportunities for friction with the EU, particularly in the Mediterranean.

In this sense, the probable Turkish operations against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militants associated with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG, part of the SDF) will represent a first test case, with many EU member states and a large part of European public opinion aligning in support of the SDF. Moreover, Erdoğan will use the uncertainties surrounding Türkiye’s EU membership internally, both to strengthen domestic support by blaming the EU for its double standards, and to justify assertive actions in the Mediterranean.

Türkiye’s victory in Syria must be analyzed through various lenses. The Russian and Iranian defeats represent a success, but greater Turkish assertiveness in Syria—primarily against SDF forces—and elsewhere will lead to tensions, more or less veiled, with US and European partners.