Türkiye Looks South: Opportunities and Risks for Ankara in Syria

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) three-week blitzkrieg, which ended the Assad regime’s 54-year rule in Syria, has thrust Türkiye into the spotlight, largely in a positive way. Turkish officials deny that HTS is a proxy or that Türkiye had any role in Assad’s downfall, but the result is widely seen as a geopolitical win for Ankara. However, this perception brings both significant opportunities and considerable risks.

Türkiye’s key opportunity lies in fostering a friendly government in Damascus. Such an alignment would reduce immediate security threats and pave the way for deeper political and economic cooperation. Domestically, it offers a chance to address the refugee issue, a sensitive political issue in Türkiye. A stable Syria could allow for the voluntary return of some of the refugees, easing domestic tensions. The postwar reconstruction of Syria also holds economic promise, with Turkish companies well-positioned to secure infrastructure contracts. 

In terms of security, Türkiye has an opportunity to eliminate the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) presence along its border with Syria. A cooperative Syrian government could become a crucial ally in neutralizing this long-standing threat. Additionally, a stable Syria could enable Türkiye to negotiate long-term agreements, such as an Exclusive Economic Zone agreement, further bolstering its regional influence.

Yet, stability in Syria is far from guaranteed. One major risk lies in Türkiye’s relationship with HTS. While Türkiye has managed to influence HTS to some extent, the latter’s long-term intentions remain uncertain. Should HTS fail to moderate, a radical Islamist regime on Türkiye’s southern border could present a severe security challenge. The fragile political transition process in Syria poses another risk. If it collapses, Syria could descend into chaos, spurring terrorism, instability, and additional refugee flows, all of which would directly impact Türkiye’s security and economy.

Moreover, regional actors such as members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and other non-democratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa might perceive Syria’s transformation as a revival of the Arab Spring, threatening their own stability. This could lead to coordinated actions against Türkiye similar to the pushback seen between 2015 and 2020.

The fall of the Assad regime has disrupted Iran’s land bridge to the Levant and weakened Russia’s strategic foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye’s effective management of Syria’s transition could help reduce refugee flows to Europe and curb terrorism. However, despite these shared interests, a lack of coordination between Türkiye, Europe, and the United States risks missing a critical opportunity for synergy, and could even set Türkiye and its transatlantic partners on a collision course in Syria if not addressed soon.

Finally, while Türkiye and Israel increasingly have overlapping geopolitical interests, the lack of political dialogue remains a vulnerability. Missteps by either side could escalate tensions, complicating Ankara’s efforts to stabilize Syria and maintain regional balance.

To address these challenges, Türkiye must adopt a strategic, inclusive approach. Engaging major Arab powers as stakeholders in Syria’s transformation can reduce resistance and foster cooperation. Ankara should also use its influence over HTS to promote an inclusive governance model, preventing the rise of a radical regime. Lastly, facilitating dialogue among Damascus, Europe, and the United States can help ensure international support for a stable transition. 

Türkiye’s position in Syria reflects both strength and vulnerability. It is in a strong position to shape the outcome. However, its success hinges on balancing ambition with pragmatic risk management. And the stakes are very high for Syria, Türkiye, and the entire region.