Maintain Focus
The US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) detailed charges against Iranian operatives involved in the plot to assassinate Donald Trump during the recent presidential campaign should dispel any skepticism about US national security threats emanating from foreign interference operations. If Trump is serious about advancing “peace through strength”, he should advance US government efforts to push back against these threats. After all, it is his administration that foreign adversaries will target in the next four years to destabilize the United States domestically and undermine its interests abroad.
For the moment, however, such threats do not appear to be a priority. Elon Musk’s alleged talks with Iran’s UN ambassador on easing tensions, along with longstanding skepticism in Trump circles about a Russian threat, may lead to the erosion of important US government work to counter foreign interference. This comes despite agreement among senior Republicans and Democrats and the US intelligence community that US adversaries—especially Iran, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and even Russia—have a vested interest in destabilizing the United States. During the 2024 campaign, Iran conducted a hack-and-leak of the Trump campaign, including of the email accounts of campaign co-chair Susie Wiles and adviser Roger Stone. The effort, pulled from Russia’s 2016 playbook to try to spread damaging information about the campaign through the media. Iran and Russia committed significant resources to information manipulation campaigns, surreptitiously amplifying polarizing narratives to inflame tensions among American voters.
Meanwhile, the PRC, though not a factor in attempts to interfere in the presidential election, sought to influence congressional races in which perceived anti-Beijing candidates were on the ballot, according to the US intelligence community. The PRC routinely conducts information operations on social media, using artificial intelligence tools and inauthentic accounts, among other tactics, to shape Americans’ views on China and, like Iran and Russia, amplify divisions among Americans on polarizing issues.
Indeed, foreign interference operations do not have to impact the results of an election to have a deleterious impact on American democracy. The PRC, Iran, and Russia regularly conduct operations inside the United States. The DOJ’s charges against Iranian assets include a plot to kill an Iranian-American journalist, a clear case of transnational repression and subversion of US civil society. Equally broadly, Iran and Russia use a variety of tactics to amplify mis- and disinformation and spread state propaganda among Americans while masking the fact that that content was created in Tehran and Moscow.
Unmasking and countering foreign interference requires that US government agencies prioritize the issue and have structures in place to coordinate action against multi-faceted threats. In intelligence, law enforcement, and policy circles, the US government, fortunately, is better positioned to address these threats than ever before. In 2019, Congress authorized the establishment of the Foreign Malign Influence Center in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The center, launched in 2022, systematically monitors and assesses nation-state efforts to conduct campaigns against US democracy and national interests. Its reporting on foreign threats to the presidential election established a good practice for government transparency when such threats can affect Americans’ perceptions of election integrity.
The Trump administration will have the option to close the center by the end of 2028. It should neither do this nor manipulate resources to focus solely on politically expedient adversaries like Iran and the PRC. Russia, North Korea, and other countries have serious capabilities—from ransomware and other malicious cyber tools to propaganda apparatuses—for disrupting US businesses, institutions, and social services. Maintaining an intelligence hub dedicated to coordinating threat information and analysis across agencies is critical.
Similarly, law enforcement resources must be devoted to holding nation-state actors accountable for breaking the law. Though it is difficult to arrest and punish these foreign actors, indictments provide a record of the tools and tactics that US adversaries use to target the country’s elections, institutions, and citizens. The DOJ’s indictment of two senior Russian state media personnel helped to shut down a sophisticated Russian operation to spread Kremlin messaging to Americans, using unwitting American influencers as conduits, to spread Moscow’s messaging to their fellow citizens. Exposure may not be a foolproof deterrent, but it can materially affect adversaries’ capabilities. Exposing tools and tactics can force hostile nation states to cancel future operations, but it could also lead them to spend time and resources investing in new pathways to conduct interference campaigns. Still, exposure can materially affect adversaries’ capabilities.
Finally, countering foreign interference requires concerted policy efforts to raise the costs for adversaries. Imposing sanctions, communicating messaging publicly and privately to adversaries about the activities that the United States considers out of bounds, rallying US allies to impose similar costs, and even harnessing military and intelligence capabilities to push back forcefully must be part of policy discussions to address foreign interference. The first Trump administration took a range of actions on these issues. A second Trump administration ought to do the same by using the full power of the state to try to change US adversaries’ strategic calculus—no matter which countries wage those campaigns or whom they target.