Redefining Relevance: New Coordinates for US-German Relations

The next chapter in US-German relations is not going to be written by Donald Trump alone. It is going to be the result of a reset of the relevance of the two countries to each other as both are preparing for a change in government in 2025 and are on the verge of potentially significant shifts in foreign policy. The next phase will also be shaped by the first generation with no real memories of the Cold War or the Berlin Wall. 

The past eight decades have witnessed a long period of multidimensional relations between Germany and the United States, evolving from post-World War II occupation to partnership across political, security, economic, and social arenas. While the relationship has had periods of tension and conflict, particularly after reunification, the depths of cooperation across many sectors has provided a buffer to any strains that emerged in the political realm. During the Cold War, when a divided Germany was the front line, those ties were existential. The nature of the relationship changed with the unification of Germany in 1990, an event that became a lasting symbol of “partnership in leadership”, as President George H. W. Bush labeled it. In general, since unification the relationship has been defined by shared values and goals. 

But partnership naturally did not mean full agreement, and there were periodic clashes over tactics or the best way to achieve a desired outcome. In those instances, disagreements were often full-throated. Yet, working through them was shaped by the fact that the combination of shared interests and interdependence was larger than the discord. The relevance of the two countries to each other remained intact in a larger global context in which alliances mattered more than differences in style or tactics in confronting challenges. There was a broad recognition that Germany and the United States needed each other, even if that need was asymmetrical. This basic assumption may be shifting. 

In recent years, the relevance of the US-German relationship has become entangled in in both domestic and foreign policy debates in the two countries. Increasing disagreements have combined with the steady erosion of shared memories and instincts of cooperation as the generations shift. Even as we face similar problems, frictions have emerged over how to confront them, over the capacities needed to meet them, and over expectations of each other. Both countries face serious domestic problems in dealing with immigration, environmental threats, economic imbalances, and political polarization, but the decisions about how to deal with them differ in style and substance. Our responses to global challenges also reflect differing priorities or evaluation of tools to confront them. 

In addition, those who are responsible for the policies on both sides of the Atlantic do not check themselves against the patterns of the past. Joe Biden was often described as the last President to be steeped in the inviolability of transatlantic relations. This factor may be weaker on the US side of the equation, as German leaders still are instinctual transatlanticists. But below the leadership level, this commitment is weakening in both populations. The postwar generations in Germany now assuming power are impacted more by milestones of recent relations with the United States, than by those their predecessors experienced. These recent milestones tended to be instances in which our policies have diverged rather than aligned—including the Iraq war, approaches to climate change, and strategic perspectives on how best to deal with Russia and China. 

The challenge for US-German relations will be resetting the relevance of each to the other. What will the Trump administration value in relations with Germany? What will Germany get from Washington and what will it need in addition to sustain its interests in Europe and in the global game? The answers to questions about how, when, where, and why the two countries need each other are changing. The best answer seems to be that Germany and Europe should take overdue and needed steps to restore European strength and capabilities in the security, economic, and political spheres. Increased European contributions will not only reinforce our continued core similarities in desired outcomes but will address complaints about unfair treatment from both sides. A more equal partnership may not be fully in the spirit of “America First”, but would demand respect and increase the appeal of transatlantic cooperation. 

With the German elections now scheduled for February 2025, the next government needs to use the opportunity to pursue a path that renews Germany's engagement in Europe as well as with the new administration in Washington. This should not be seen as a choice between those two challenges. Weaknesses in both relationships need to be addressed in order to strengthen Europe and transatlantic relations. Trump did not create the security risks that Europe currently faces, and he did not create the economic challenges facing Germany. Nor did he create the clashes within Germany that are contributing to political instability. These are homemade problems within Germany and throughout Europe and they require European solutions. 

The two sides of the Atlantic will continue to grapple with similar problems and will likely come up with different solutions, but how these challenges are addressed is highly relevant to both. Whether it be finding a path to peace in Ukraine or the Middle East or dealing with the challenges China poses, sharing solutions as well as burdens will be more promising than taking separate approaches and can lay the foundation for the next chapter of transatlantic cooperation. 

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.