Ukraine, the first test for the new transatlantic relationship

This article first appeared in Le Monde, on Thursday, November 7, 2024. 

Donald Trump's return to the White House puts an end to the Biden parenthesis and confronts Europeans with their strategic responsibilities. In the wake of an election that gives the Republicans ample room to maneuver in implementing their agenda, two questions arise. Can Europeans build a new security model for their continent? And what role do they wish to play in the strategic competition between the United States and China?

Donald Trump's reelection is forcing the acceleration of a process of reflection that should have been seriously launched back in the 2010s. Without being alarmist or naive, Europeans must rapidly come up with political solutions to both these challenges.

Donald Trump understands the transatlantic alliance as an organization enabling allies to benefit from American protection for their own security at a lower cost. European defense spending will be one of the hot topics of the first transatlantic exchanges.

Rather than yielding to the temptation of bilateral agreements in which each country seeks to “buy” American protection, Europe needs to consider a coordinated approach by rationalizing its industrial base. This is an absolute priority, as Europe can no longer afford to outsource its defense to the United States. NATO's new secretary general, Mark Rutte, and other European leaders will have to convince Trump that this development can be presented as a political victory in the United States.

First test for the transatlantic relationship

At the same time, the Ukrainian question will be crucial to the redefinition of the European security space. It will also be the first test for the transatlantic relationship. Donald Trump has presented himself to his voters as the man who can avert World War III. There is no doubt that a deal with Vladimir Putin is a top priority on his foreign policy agenda. 

Europe's response must be threefold: assert itself in the consultations; agree on the conditions that must not be sacrificed in a ceasefire; and continue to support Ukraine, even in the event of a frozen conflict, to prevent further Russian aggression.

Donald Trump will want to make Ukraine's future a purely European problem, so that he can concentrate on the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. For all that, the Europeans are not without economic and diplomatic levers to convince him of the benefits of political coordination with them. To do so, willing to play the game of a transactional relationship with Washington, and weighing up different issues, including their relationship with China, is necessary. 

With his promise to implement major tariffs in the first days of his administration, Trump is making the prospect of a trade war more than likely, and Europeans will have no choice but to respond harshly at first and seek a negotiated settlement. In the longer term, however, the real danger to European competitiveness lies more in the evolution of the economic and technological rivalry between the United States and China.

Trump will demand alignment from allies on three points: first, condemnation of Chinese overproduction policies, which in his eyes, create unfair competition; second, denunciation of China's actions on the international stage—often in support of Russia and Iran—that threaten geopolitical stability in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific; third, acceptance that the Chinese market no longer represents a major economic opportunity for European and American companies.

In Europe, the challenge of unity

Europeans must not align themselves with his demands but must consider his requests as levers for negotiation with a new Trump administration. Once again, the main challenge is to agree on common European priorities. While the majority of Europeans can agree on the geopolitical aspects, they remain divided on their economic relationship with China. A common defense of European interests in the face of American pressure requires defining points of agreement on relations with China, even before Donald Trump arrives in the White House.

Trump's vision of the relationship with China will also be imposed on all US partners around the world. It is clear that, while Trump will reaffirm his support for Israel and Saudi Arabia in the face of Iran, he will also make it conditional on a stronger alignment of their policies on the China question. 

The EU can draw inspiration from other regional powers—whether they have an alliance treaty with the United States, such as Japan does, or a strategic partnership, such as India does—that will seek to preserve their strategic autonomy in the face of Washington's demands. A rapprochement with the United Kingdom, which largely shares the situation of the EU countries, is also a matter of course.

Historically, periods of transatlantic crises have been accompanied by strong intra-European divisions. Preserving a minimum of unity in Europe will constitute the greatest challenge in the months and years ahead. This will have to be done despite the weakness of Franco-German leadership, in alliance with other countries, for example, on the model of the Weimar Triangle (a trilateral cooperation structure among France, Germany, and Poland created in 1991), at a time when the latter is calling for an end to the “era of geopolitical subcontracting”.

The election of Donald Trump offers Europeans an opportunity to adapt to the new geopolitical realities and compensate for the recalibration of American priorities: Faced with exacerbated American economic nationalism and China's policy of containment, we must avoid the scenario of a downgraded and short-circuited Europe.

The synchronization of a new American administration with a new European Commission offers a unique opportunity to build together the priorities of the transatlantic agenda for the next four years. The initiative and the ideas will have to come from Europe, because they will no longer come from Washington.