The EU: On The Edge
The current concern, however, is different from that in 2016, when the focus was on dealing with Trump as a political personality. This question persists, but there are now other, more troubling issues.
First, existing trade and regulatory differences across the Atlantic are likely to pale in comparison to the challenges posed by Trump’s proposed tariffs. There is every prospect of an open US trade war with China, with negative implications for Europe. In all likelihood, this protectionism will extend to the EU. Trump’s return will fuel economic nationalism, already growing on both sides of the Atlantic. Europe, already facing slow growth and declining competitiveness, does not hold strong cards in this game.
Second, Trump will surely press Europe much harder on defense burden-sharing. The more extreme scenarios of American withdrawal from NATO or complete disengagement from European security are unlikely to materialize. But the prospect of a faster US pivot away from Europe in security terms is daunting even for those who welcome greater European strategic autonomy. This goal, however, remains largely aspirational. Europe’s ability to compensate for shifts in American defense posture and credibility is many years away at best. On a range of international policy issues close to European interests, from Iran to energy security, Brussels and Washington will not be on the same page.
Third, the contrast with the Biden years is likely to be most pronounced in Washington’s attitude toward the EU itself. The outgoing administration saw the bloc as a key interlocutor on a range of international policy issues, not just on trade. There was an especially close relationship between the White House and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and her cabinet. This was unusual. Previous US administrations, regardless of party, were generally less enthusiastic, preferring bilateral engagement with key European allies. A second Trump administration is likely to frame relations with Europe in bilateral terms, with individual states and individual leaders, some of whom will be quite comfortable with the outcome of the US election. Brussels could be marginalized.