Orbán De-Escalates—But He Will Strike Again
After the tumultuous start to Hungary’s Presidency of the Council of the EU last month that saw provocative foreign trips by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, including to Russia, EU politics is back to business as usual with other member states divided on how to respond.
Meanwhile, Orbán is carrying out a tactical de-escalation. He is adapting after the unexpectedly harsh initial reactions of the EU institutions and member states, aiming to lay low to get to the fall unscathed. Then, when the political calendar gives him the opportunity, he can be expected to take his disruptive diplomacy to new levels.
Live to Fight Another Day
The reactions his ill-intentioned “peace offensive” provoked showed to Orbán that he somewhat miscalculated with his attempt to disrupt EU foreign policy. Even if mostly symbolic, these were surprisingly swift and straightforward.
European Council President Charles Michel, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell immediately condemned Orbán’s Moscow trip. All the other member states except Slovakia criticized Orbán’s abuse of the rotating Council Presidency and his clear violation of the EU’s principle of sincere cooperation. Some also started to boycott various meetings of the presidency, and the European Commission announced it would boycott meetings at the political level.
Faced with this unexpected determination to show Hungary’s government a yellow card and realizing that provocations might trigger more than symbolic actions, Orbán decided to de-escalate.
The absence of the Council Presidency logo in Hungary’s official communication following Orbán’s meeting with Donald Trump after the NATO summit in Washington, the removal of the Make Europe Great Again slogan from the Council Presidency banners in the European Parliament, and Orbán’s detailed debriefing letter to Michel about his trips had only one purpose: to defuse the accusations of abuse and lack of sincere cooperation.
The initial unity among other member states gave way to divergent views on how far they should go in their response to Orbán’s actions and whether even a symbolic boycott of Hungary’s presidency was acceptable.
At the same time, however, the initial unity among other member states gave way to divergent views on how far they should go in their response to Orbán’s actions and whether even a symbolic boycott of Hungary’s presidency was acceptable. Austria’s Chancellor Karl Nehammer has condemned the idea. The Netherlands did not join the group of eight boycotting countries—Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden—due to opposition in its coalition government from Geert Wilder’s party. Adding to the confusion, Borrell backed away from his idea of convening an official Foreign Affairs Council on the same days as the informal foreign and defense meeting in Hungary at the end of August, only to later go back to his original plan.
Cutting short Hungary’s Council Presidency would be the best way to deal with Orbán’s abuse of it, and this could be done immediately with the available legal tools. But it will not happen due to lack of political will.
The reasons why some member states will not play hardball with Hungary range from the domestic influence of the radical right (Austria, the Netherlands) to a desire to avoid setting a precedent for infringing on member states’ sovereignty (Greece, Luxembourg). But, regardless, this disunity shows Orbán that time is on his side. In the coming weeks, he will sit tight, let other member states ridicule themselves for not being able to agree on how to respond, and let the perception that he poses a threat fade.
A Fall Second Strike
Other member states are actually missing the opportunity to prevent more of Orbán’s disruptive diplomacy and abuse the Council Presidency in the coming months around the elections in Georgia, Moldova, and the United States. And, at that point, there will be barely time or space for the EU to respond.
In late October, Georgia will hold parliamentary elections and Moldova a presidential one and a referendum to include in the constitution the aim of EU membership. In these countries, an intervention by Orbán under the pretext of representing the EU could tilt the balance in favor of pro-Kremlin forces, opponents of EU integration, or the governing Georgian Dream party. This would have far-reaching negative consequences for Georgian and Moldovan society.
Orbán will be well positioned to troll the EU over the US presidential election in November too. For example, he could congratulate Trump for winning in front of a Council Presidency banner while the vote count or recount is underway in several states. This would have no impact in the United States, but it would be a diplomatic nightmare for EU policymakers.
He could also invite Trump to the meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) in Budapest on November 7, two days after the election. Hosting Trump if the result of the election is still in limbo would be a diplomatic hijacking of the EPC by Orbán. Member countries could not boycott the meeting because they would not risk their future relations with Trump as long as he is officially still in race, while the Democrats in Washington would see inviting him as interference in US domestic affairs. In contrast, if by then the Republican is the president-elect, hosting him would allow Orbán to shine as a mover and shaker of the transatlantic relationship in the new Trump era.
It was predictable well before the start of Hungary’s Council Presidency that Orbán would abuse this position to disrupt EU foreign policy. It is equally predictable now that the disunity among member states on how to respond to his first provocations will encourage him to strike again when the political calendar will be in his favor—in the knowledge he will likely go unpunished.