Ukrainian Restoration Governance

In 2023, GMF mapped out the new governing institutions and civil society coalitions that were mobilizing Ukraine for a transparent and accountable process of national restoration. In partnership with G7 allies, the restoration system was working well and was thus acquiring power in Kyiv. In response, Andriy Yermak, the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, in May 2024 ousted the system’s leaders and split the Restoration Ministry in two. He is expected to install his own loyalists to run the ministries soon.

The future of Ukrainian restoration management is now highly uncertain due to this political risk. The landscape analyses published by GMF last year no longer provide donors and other stakeholders with reliable guidance about how to navigate these governing institutions. Instead, this piece helps the international community continue to track fluid dynamics in Kyiv by offering four lessons learned from the rise and fall of institutions governing Ukraine’s national restoration.

1. Modern professional governance is possible in Ukraine: The Restoration Ministry and Agency demonstrated that it is possible to build governing institutions within the Ukrainian system that coordinate large national projects and drive cooperation among dozens of other relevant institutions. These agencies have not only proven themselves capable of building institutional independence and capacity, but have also developed cutting-edge transparency tools such as the Digital Reconstruction Ecosystem for Accountable Management (DREAM) and well-governed systems of controlling money such as the Liquidation Fund. They also showed that any attempted corruption will be met with swift accountability: when members of parliament from President Zelenskyy’s own party allegedly attempted to bribe them, the restoration leaders referred the cases to independent anti-corruption authorities—who arrested the MPs.
2. But Old Ukraine often dominates high-level governance: As in any political system, achieving major results—such as keeping export corridors alive and protecting the energy grid in close cooperation with G7 allies—naturally leads to capable managers’ accrual of power and influence. But in Kyiv, that process of acquiring power sometimes went too far, as when Deputy Prime Minister and then-Minister of Infrastructure Oleksandr Kubrakov sought to become Defense Minister while retaining control over the Ministry of Infrastructure by leaving a loyalist from his team as its head. More ominously, Yermak sacked Kubrakov and the top leaders working for him because this team of transparency reformers was growing into a power center that Yermak did not sufficiently control. He is now expected to consolidate his informal power over the Ministry and Agency for Restoration and the money they control by installing his own loyalists to lead these institutions.
3. Governance is more urgent than anti-corruption: In wartime Ukraine, engaging in corruption is risky. Drive around in a fancy car or sleep in an oligarch’s mansion and you will be fired and investigated. By contrast, a worsening problem is the concentration of power under the Office of the President, which has operated with too much opaque influence and bypassed democratic accountability over the past six Ukrainian administrations. Centralization under the office of the president is worse than ever under martial law and the unique personalities of Yermak and his deputies such as Oleh Tatarov. For most of the past three decades, anti-corruption experts have been pushing the development community to focus on corruption rather than governance per se; but in wartime Ukraine, that dichotomy has flipped, with governance becoming the more urgent threat.
4. Donors need to step in and help reestablish faith in the institutions of restoration: Donors should continue to support Ukraine’s restoration institutions through technical assistance that delivers critical expertise, financial assistance that supports the salaries of civil servants (who earn below-market wages), and conditionality tied to the preservation and expansion of reforms pioneered by Kubrakov and his team of transparency reformers at the Ministry and Agency of Restoration. Donors should also support civil society organizations (CSOs) involved in restoration by giving them a seat at the donor coordination table; providing capacity-building support; establishing a system for the selection of qualified implementers; entering the Ukrainian context through local CSO coalitions; mandating the use of the DREAM data ecosystem; and insisting upon cooperation with Ukrainian CSOs.

In 2023, the professional achievements of CSOs and capable restoration managers showcased the New Ukraine that has been building up steadily since 2014. In 2024, a political backlash against that progress proved that Old Ukraine remains alive and powerful during the war. To ensure that Ukraine emerges from the current phase of the war as a European democracy that embodies the ideals of the Revolution of Dignity, it needs a national restoration process that is well governed with strong guidance and support from civil society and international donors.

The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of GMF.